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**RE-INVENTING GERMAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY:
A STRUGGLE TO BE UNDERSTOOD**

by

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**RE-INVENTING GERMAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: A STRUGGLE
TO BE UNDERSTOOD**

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1960s, too few American observers of policy have given enough attention to the workings of diplomacy and strategy amongst the Atlantic democracies.¹

Donald Abenheim

Characterizations of an “old” and “new” Europe; concerns over a dying NATO; proposed plans to reduce US military bases in Western Europe in favor of opening new ones in Eastern Europe; no phone call from the US President congratulating the German Chancellor on his re-election—what can account for such unhelpful and problematic developments in trans-Atlantic relations? Why has the relationship between two of the world’s most trusted and reliable allies come to such a situation?

This thesis argues that such a deterioration in trans-Atlantic relations stems from a profound misunderstanding and lack of appreciation for what is most commonly called strategic culture. Specifically, this thesis takes the position that a failure to appropriately understand what is a distinctly national and unique German strategic culture has been a main cause of the present uncomfortable relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as troubled relations among the most senior NATO member countries. While such factors as political and strategic culture have been a part of political science and foreign policy analysis for decades, there is a relatively small body of literature which addresses the specific relationship between, what is termed in this thesis, national security culture and actual foreign and security policy decision making.

This thesis attempts to show how a nation’s values, beliefs, and preconceptions (in short, its national security culture), can have a powerful influence upon the foreign and security policy decision making process at all

¹ Donald Abenheim, Foreword, *Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: December 1996), p. ix.

levels. Moreover, this study highlights the importance of strategic culture as an important influence upon a nation's efforts to reform and transform its armed forces—a contemporary theme in virtually every modern Western democracy since the end of the Cold War.

Specific research questions to be explored in this thesis include: What is the relationship of strategic culture to foreign and security policy decision making? What can be learned from a better examination and understanding of German strategic culture? What are the major influences of strategic culture on Germany's efforts to transform and modernize its armed forces? How can a better understanding and appreciation of the effects of national security culture on foreign and security policy contribute to improved US-German relations?

The case will be made that not only does culture matter when it comes to such specific national decisions as defense reform and military deployments, but also that failing to adequately understand and appreciate the peculiarities of a nation's security culture (in this case that of Germany) can, and does, lead to a deterioration of bi-lateral relations and is a major cause of the current difficulties facing US-German relations today. This thesis uses a process-tracing methodology to examine the evolution of German strategic culture since the end of the Cold War, and the resulting security and defense reforms since 1990. The study uses a survey of the pertinent primary and secondary scholarly literature on the topic stemming from governmental publications, documented policies, and the writings of regional experts and other foreign and security policy intellectuals. Sources include first hand interviews with government, parliamentary, and military officials; editorials from German academics and security and defense policy observers; as well as applicable mass media articles and scholarly journals.

This examination will begin in the next chapter with a closer look at what is considered strategic culture, and a review of the major theories related to its influence on foreign and security policy. Additionally, it will describe the specific nature of what can be called German national security culture both before and

since the end of the Cold War and German reunification in 1990. Having gained a better understanding for what is German national security culture, the essay will then turn in Chapter III to one of the most important manifestations of German security and defense policy—the reform and transformation of the German armed forces (the *Bundeswehr*). This chapter looks at the history of Bundeswehr reform efforts since the dramatic events of 1989-1990, and tries to explain the major political and strategic goals behind such reform. It outlines the struggles involved with successful execution of military transformation, and the ways in which German strategic culture have influenced defense reform efforts.

Finally, Chapter IV is a concluding chapter which seeks to put the issues explored throughout this thesis into a current perspective by making some observations about how the major political parties, government officials, and the soldiers themselves see German security and defense reform. It ends with a few generalizations as to how a better appreciation for what is German national security culture, and its past experiences, can lead to not only better relations among allies and partners, but also how a better understanding even among German leaders can help them through the myriad of challenges and decisions that lay ahead.

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II. GERMAN POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CULTURE

A. THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL DEBATE

For decades political scientists, international relations experts, and foreign policy observers have debated over which set of forces influences the foreign policy decisions of democratic nations more—internal forces or external forces. Internal, also called domestic, forces are those factors which influence policy makers from inside the nation, such as domestic public opinion, political party positions, and the mindset of political elites. External forces are those factors which influence policy makers from outside the nation, such as alliance and international organization relationships, neighboring countries' policies, and regional or international crises.

Those favoring the primacy of internal factors usually point to the desire of governments to get re-elected, and the need to maintain a political balance in favor of the government as evidence for their claim. This camp holds that international pressures alone are insufficient to explain the scope, direction, and timing of policy decisions, and that “foreign policy is affected less by fears of other countries’ relative gains or losses than it is by the domestic distributional consequences of cooperative endeavors.”² Those favoring the primacy of external factors believe that changes in the external operating environment are most often catalysts for a reorientation of state behavior. To that end, foreign policy is essentially the mechanism a state uses to carry out this reorientation and to adapt to changes in its environment.³ This camp also goes on to predict when a nation’s foreign policy is most likely to change: “when developments

² Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 9-10.

³ See Bengt Sundelius, *Changing Course: When Neutral Sweden Chose to Join the European Community*, in Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith, eds., European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 177-201; and James N. Rosenau, The Study of Political Adaptation: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics (New York: Nichols Publishing, 1981), p. 42.

abroad give rise to potential threats to their essential structures.”⁴ Most foreign policy change results from external shocks, or “dramatic international events.”⁵

Strong cases can be, and have been, made on both sides of this debate. To be sure, there are times when one can ascertain that domestic influences were paramount in a country’s foreign policy decision and times when external influences were the driving factor. Certainly it is not the aim of this research to attempt a stand on one side or the other of this debate. Instead, the thesis of this research is that the primary factors in determining foreign policy decisions, at least as far as Germany is concerned, are not internal or external factors but rather the way in which both sets of factors are viewed. In borrowing from the ground breaking work of the late Wolfram Hanrieder, this thesis argues that one must examine the linkages between the “internal predispositions” of the country (including value systems and political culture) and conditions in the external environment in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of foreign policy. Hanrieder felt that foreign policy restructuring ultimately hinges on compatibility and consensus. Compatibility refers to “the degrees of feasibility of various foreign policy goals, given the strictures and opportunities of the international system,”⁶ and consensus is “the amount of domestic political agreement regarding the ends and means of foreign policy change.”⁷

It is in the examination of these linkages and the ability to find compatibility and consensus, that the issue of culture looms large. For it is the idea of culture, political and strategic, which provides the lens through which these linkages between internal and external factors are viewed, colored, and analyzed. It is precisely those “predispositions” held by a population and its political elite which

⁴ James N. Rosenau, The Study of Political Adaptation: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics (New York: Nichols Publishing, 1981), p. 42.

⁵ Charles F. Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 34, no. 1, 1990, p. 14.

⁶ Wolfram Hanrieder, “Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy,” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 61, no. 4, December 1967, p. 1977.

⁷ Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Unification, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 7.

determine not only the amount of compatibility and consensus needed to reach a decision, but which form the very basis of a nation's foreign policy conscious, thereby influencing which policy options are even to be considered and which ones are not.

This type of cultural approach is extremely useful in explaining Germany's foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War, which has thus far not been consistent with a purely realist, neo-realist, or structuralist explanation. In recent decades, more and more scholars have begun to adopt a more culturally oriented approach when seeking to account for the foreign and security policies of states, especially in reference to post-Cold War Germany. The recent works of authors like Berger, Duffield, Lantis, Otte, Pye, Risse-Kappen and Verba have served to shed new light on the importance of political, strategic, and military culture when it comes to studying democratic nations' foreign and security policy decisions.⁸ This trend is, at least in part, due to the failure of neo-realism to adequately explain the dramatic yet peaceful turn of events in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By taking both domestic political conditions (including political military culture) and external "strategic dilemmas"⁹ into account, one can fully analyze and appreciate the set of internal-external linkages which have determined German national security policy since 1991.

That being said, what has been the nature of German foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War, and why has it, according to John Duffield,

⁸ Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," *International Organization*, vol. 53, no. 4, Autumn 1999, pp. 756-803. Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Unification, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002). Max Otte, A Rising Middle Power? German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989-1999, (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 2000). Lucian W. Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," and Sidney Verba, "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture," in Pye and Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965). Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

⁹ This phrase is taken from Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Unification, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002).

confounded neo-realists?¹⁰ Moreover, did the dramatic changes in world politics from 1989 to 1991 lead to an equally dramatic change in the foreign and security policy of a newly unified Germany? Since unification, is Germany's foreign policy a story of continuity or a story of change? To properly answer these questions one must gain at least a basic understanding for what German foreign and security policy was like before the events of 1989-1990, during the forty-plus years of the Cold War.

B. COLD WAR GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

As Lantis points out, "the foundation for contemporary German foreign policy was established during the Cold War, when the Federal Republic (as West Germany) pursued one of the most consistent foreign affairs profiles of any democracy from 1949 to 1990."¹¹ This consistent profile focused on the themes of restraint, humanitarianism, and multilateral cooperation. Known as *Westbindung* (meaning a totally Western oriented foreign policy) under German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and later called *Verantwortungspolitik*, or foreign policy of responsibility, Germany felt the weight of its past transgressions and sought refuge in the cooperative institutions of the European Community (EC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United Nations (UN).¹² Also a key part of Germany's foreign policy stance was the restrictions (both allied-imposed and self-imposed) on any type of assertive military posture. This theme became deeply rooted in the public psyche, in foreign policy tradition, and in the German Basic Law, or *Grundgesetz*.¹³ During this period, Oxford historian Timothy Garton Ash argued that the Federal Republic "excelled at the patient,

¹⁰ John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," *International Organization*, vol. 53, no. 4, Autumn 1999, pp. 756-803.

¹¹ Jeffrey S. Lantis, *Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Unification*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 2.

¹² The term *Westbindung* was used by German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer immediately after WWII, and the term *Verantwortungspolitik* was developed later by former German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, see Lantis, p. 2.

¹³ See Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

discreet pursuit of national goals through multilateral institutions and negotiations.”¹⁴

As the Cold War progressed into a bi-polar contest between the US-NATO forces on one side and the USSR-Warsaw Pact on the other, Germany found itself squarely in the *Mittellage*,¹⁵ sandwiched between the two nuclear powers. This realization, along with Chancellor Willy Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* beginning in 1969, resulted in Germany pursuing a very methodical, predictable, and low-profile foreign policy designed to prove Germany’s reliability as an ally, recognize the status quo of a partitioned Germany, and highlight West Germany’s commitment to never ‘go it alone’ in world affairs.

During the Cold War, there were several reasons for Germany to pursue this type of foreign policy. The first reason was the Soviet threat, in both its military and ideological form. As already mentioned, West Germany was on the front line of the principal theater of any East-West confrontation (the *Mittellage*). Therefore, in order to achieve at least some measure of security from the Soviets, Germany had to forge and maintain strong alliance ties with the Western powers while simultaneously trying to avoid any moves that might antagonize the Soviet Union. Additionally, after joining NATO, this meant making a large contribution to its own national defense.¹⁶

The second reason for a restrained foreign policy was West Germany’s dependency upon the United States for security. Having renounced any intentions to build or obtain nuclear weapons as the price of admission into NATO, Germany depended upon the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States for its security. This naturally obliged West Germany to avoid pursuing

¹⁴ Timothy Garton Ash, “Germany’s Choice,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 43, July-August 1994, p. 71.

¹⁵ For a more detailed analysis of this concept see Helga Haftendorn, “Gulliver in der Mitte Europas: Internationale Verflechtung und nationale Handlungsmöglichkeiten,” in Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. Maull, eds., *deutschlands neue Außenpolitik. Band 1: Grundlagen* (München: Oldenbourg, 1994).

¹⁶ James S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1998, p. 42.

any policy which might be seen as in conflict with the Western powers, lest she risk losing the protection provided. This need for maintaining Western support continued to influence German foreign policy even after many of the formal controls that had been placed on German armaments were removed.¹⁷

A third reason for Germany's Cold War policy of restraint and caution was the physical partition of its territory into East and West. This situation only intensified the precarious position of the *Mittellage*. On the one hand, West Germany needed Western support if it was ever to realize unification in the future, but on the other hand, if Germany did not seek at least some level of cooperation with the Soviet Union it might never break the status quo. Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was Germany's main and most well-known effort to strike the appropriate balance between these two competing sides. This meant that sometimes German foreign and security policy was at odds with the desires and expectations of its Western partners, one example being the Euro-missiles dispute in the 1980s.¹⁸

The final source of constraint on German foreign policy during this time rested in the "historically conditioned attitudes" of Germany's neighbors toward the Federal Republic. Perhaps the best expression of this sentiment is the much quoted description of why NATO was created: 'to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.' As a result of "Germany's past transgressions,"¹⁹ namely starting two world wars in the same century and the violence of the Nazi period, most countries were strongly inclined to view any and all German actions with suspicion and mistrust. This burden of the past, and Germany's need to control it, was yet another reason to adopt policies intended to reassure its neighbors that it would never again pose a threat to them and to avoid actions that might be perceived as suspect. One very tangible result of this

¹⁷ James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1998, p. 42.

¹⁸ James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1998, p. 42.

¹⁹ Ibid. p.43.

situation was the high degree to which the German armed forces (the Bundeswehr) were integrated into NATO command and control structures. In fact, Germany did not have an autonomous national planning or command structure for its armed forces until the late 1990s, and even then the move sparked sharp criticism from the German press.²⁰

As a result of these several constraints, German foreign and security policy, and even the German nation itself, emerged radically different from the other major European powers. Notable experts and authors have each chosen to describe Germany's unique situation somewhat differently, but the overall impression is very similar; Germany had, over the course of time, developed a distinct and unique strategic culture and national security character which was profoundly affected by the dramatic events of German unification and the end of the Cold War.

Hanns Maull characterized Germany as a "civilian power" with very different motives than those usually ascribed to states by the realist school of thought. Civilian power objectives include:

- a. the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; b. the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and c. a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management.²¹

This same general analysis holds true for Kielinger and Otte who call Germany a "pressured power" while Gray spoke of Germany as the "reluctant power."²² Even Otte's later work, describing German foreign policy after unification and the

²⁰ See Thomas-Durell Young, "German National Command Structures After Unification: A New German General Staff?" *Armed Forces and Society* 22, no. 3 (Spring 1996), p. 19-21.

²¹ Hanns Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 5 (1990/91): pp. 91-107. Hanns Maull, "Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik: Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Außenpolitik," *Europa-Archiv* 47, no. 1 (1992): pp. 269-78.

²² Thomas Kielinger and Max Otte, "Germany—the Pressured Power," *Foreign Policy* 91, no. 2 (1993): pp. 44-62.

Cold War, refers to Germany as a potentially “rising middle power.”²³ Likewise, James Duffield’s analysis of German security policy is titled World Power Forsaken.²⁴ All of these terms and ideas share the general thesis that from 1945 until 1989 Germany became a major defender of the status quo in Europe. Germany was, and is, content with pursuing its three major national interests in a low-profile and non-threatening way—a strong security relationship with the United States, economic integration in Europe, and stability in Eastern Europe and Russia.²⁵ Even the realist in the group, Max Otte, realizes that Germany does not have the potential to become, and truly does not wish to become, a global power.²⁶

So then, if there is consensus as to the nature of German foreign and security policy during the Cold War, and evidence shows that there is, the question now becomes what can be said of German foreign and security policy after the Cold War and since German unification? Has there been a change in the way a newly sovereign and unified Germany, free of the Soviet threat to the East, conducts its foreign affairs? More to the point, in the wake of the break up of the Soviet Union, has German foreign policy “normalized” in the realist sense so as to spark concerns of a “resurgent Germany”?

C. POST-COLD WAR GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

The short answer to all the above questions is no. In much the same way as there was general consensus as to the nature and tone of German foreign and security policy during the Cold War, there seems to be almost as much consensus as to the overall character of Germany’s foreign and security policy

²³ Max Otte, A Rising Middle Power? German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989-1999, (New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 2000).

²⁴ James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).

²⁵ Wolfgang Gehring, in the introduction to Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Unification, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. x.

²⁶ Max Otte, A Rising Middle Power? German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989-1999, (New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 7.

since the 1989-1991 time frame. That consensus says what can now be confirmed by 14 years of history. Namely that there was no radical change in German foreign affairs behavior after the Cold War; that Germany did not use its new-found freedom of action to pursue a more aggressive or more militaristic foreign policy; and finally, that German foreign and security policy since unification has been marked by a high degree of continuity and moderation.

The reality was, in fact, that Germany did not seek to regain its past world power status, and instead exercised considerable restraint and circumspection in its external relations since unification. Despite some concerns that a united Germany may seek to acquire nuclear weapons or allow its previous alliance ties to lapse in an effort to once again play the role of a great power, this simply did not happen.²⁷ Quite contrary to these neo-realist predictions, Germany has firmly stated its commitment to maintain alliance ties, especially with NATO, and has played a leading role in strengthening other European security frameworks such as the OSCE and the European Union. Germany has continued to emphasize the use of non-military means wherever possible to achieve security, while simultaneously reducing their own military capabilities and force structure, not to mention its lack of interest whatsoever in acquiring nuclear weapons.²⁸ It was not until 2002/2003, when Germany had to make some hard choices concerning the global war on terrorism and the US-led action against Iraq, that Germany took a high profile and controversial stance in the foreign policy arena which seemed to contradict this pattern.

Saying that there is overall consensus among the leading experts as to the nature of post-Cold War German foreign and security policy does not mean there is no disagreement. As with the analysis of any nation's foreign policy actions, there are always those with different interpretations of the same overall outcome. In the case of Germany, the agreement found on the issue of overall post-Cold War foreign policy continuity is interlaced with those that also stress

²⁷ James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 3.

²⁸ James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 4.

the ways in which German foreign and security policy has changed. Specifically writers Max Otte and Jeffrey Lantis point out the areas where Germany has indeed behaved much differently than it would have before 1991. In his book, Lantis points to German actions in the 1991 Persian Gulf crisis; Bundeswehr participation in Somalia in 1993; Germany's recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and participation in the Balkans in 1991-1994; diplomatic and military involvement in Bosnia 1992-1996; and German responses to the crisis in Kosovo in 1998-1999.²⁹ He outlines how Germany's actions in each one of these events constituted a struggle to restructure its foreign policy in "fits and starts of uncertainty and hesitancy in policy development spanning a period of years."³⁰ Germany's actions in each of the above events were controversial (inside and outside the Federal Republic) precisely because they came at a time when the new Germany was finding its proper place in the post-Cold War world. Such a process is never easy, but by the end of the decade Bundeswehr troops were successfully leading NATO efforts in the Balkans, German domestic opinion was strongly behind its government's efforts, and no one was worried about a newly sovereign Germany stirring up trouble on the continent.

Max Otte, also highlighting change in German foreign policy, points to the new Schröder government of 1998 and its "new direction in Germany's policies toward Europe."³¹ Otte contends that the newly elected Red/Green coalition government was prepared to pursue a more assertive role in the area of European integration (specifically within EU budgetary matters) and contemplated a foreign policy "not burdened by the baggage of the past."³² Here again, the feeling of a newly united unencumbered Germany ready to take its rightful place on the world economic and political stage was tempered with the reality of international constraints and domestic feelings. The end result was within a few months of taking office, the Schröder government was following a

²⁹ Lantis, p. 10.

³⁰ Lantis, p. 168.

³¹ Otte, p. 196.

³² Ibid.

policy that was “almost identical to that of its predecessor government.”³³ Such behavior leads Otte to comment that although Germany’s foreign policy doctrine has changed more radically than many people realize, “the events of 1989-1991 did not change Germany’s basic security calculus.” “Germany, now more than ever, remains a pillar of the status quo.”³⁴

In the post-Cold War international system, few countries were as profoundly affected by its ensuing international crises and domestic political conditions as the Federal Republic of Germany. The international parameters that had guided German foreign policy for forty years suddenly fell away. While the overall international trend was toward fragmentation and disintegration, with countries like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia dissolving, Germany grew larger with unification.³⁵ But as has been discussed thus far, as Germany’s leaders struggled to respond to new challenges in the post-Cold War era, they ultimately returned to the same principles and beliefs that had served them well for the previous forty years. So the pressing question becomes why was this the case? Why did German foreign policy (except for the areas noted above) remain basically unchanged after 1991? After living under the shadow of the American nuclear umbrella for 40 years, why did Germany not use its new found freedom of action to begin a more proactive more nationalistic foreign policy?

D. EXPLAINING CONTINUITY: GERMAN INTERNAL-EXTERNAL LINKAGES

Returning to the internal-external debate discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the answers to these questions lie in the unique juxtaposition of Germany’s internal political-military predispositions and its external strategic dilemmas experienced during the decade after unification. Put simply, the continuity in German foreign and security policy after 1991 is the result of two

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Otte, p. 9-10.

³⁵ Robert H. Dorff, “German Policy Toward Peace Support Operations,” in *Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. December, 1996, p. 64.

primary factors: first, Germany's internal political military culture and second, its post-1991 external operating environment. Germany's current foreign and security policy can best be explained by examining the precise nature of these two factors and how the one affects the other; or using Hanrieder's terminology, by looking at the "linkage" between the internal security culture and the external environment.

1. Internal Factors

Turning first to Germany's political military culture, numerous works have been devoted to the general topic of political culture and even more common are analyses of strategic culture. Unfortunately, the concept of political culture has rarely been used to explain foreign policy and has usually remained independent from the idea of strategic culture. Pye and Verba define political culture as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressed symbols, and the values which affect the situation in which political action takes place." They contend that for individual leaders, "political culture provides the guidelines, controlling guidelines for effective political behavior; and for the collectivity, it gives a systematic structure of values" that give coherence to foreign policy.³⁶ Despite the lack of literature linking political and strategic culture to foreign policy decisions, several contemporary studies have linked these ideas to the transformation of German foreign policy.

Thomas Risse-Kappen has argued that political culture can affect the choices of top decision makers:

...by changing policy goals or how those goals are prioritized, by narrowing the range of options and/or means to implement goals, or by winning symbolic concessions in the sense of changed rhetoric rather than policy reforms.³⁷

³⁶ Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 7.

³⁷ Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics*, vol. 43, no. 2, 1991, p. 482.

Also, Thomas Berger stated that “political military culture,” a subset of the larger political culture that focuses on security issues and the use of force in international affairs, can be linked directly to Germany’s behavior in the past 50 years.³⁸

One of the more detailed analyses of how to properly link political and strategic culture to Germany’s experience comes from John Duffield. Duffield holds that strategic culture is a subset of political culture where the first isolates those components of the second which may be of direct relevance to security issues. These relevant components generally fall into five categories and form what he calls “national security culture.”³⁹ First is a nation’s world view which includes empirical beliefs about the nature of the external environment, the international system, and the nation’s place within it. Second are the national identity, loyalty, and emotional attachments. How strong is the sense of national identity, are there feelings of affinity or aversion toward other states or regional entities? The third category is the national interest. What are the principal goals and values of national security policy and how should they be prioritized? Fourth is the feeling or attitude of uncertainty about the external environment. Depending upon the level of uncertainty, different courses of action are likely to have differing consequences. The final category encompasses the shared norms and values concerning appropriate political behavior. Here, as in the fourth category, the effect is to rule out certain unethical or illegitimate forms of conduct.⁴⁰

Applying these ideas and categories to post-Cold War Germany, we find a set of predispositions, values, beliefs, and attitudes that were formed over time and which have changed little since unification. The German national security culture which evolved over the course of the 20th century was one which, when combined with the external environment, yielded a foreign policy of “dependency,

³⁸ Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

³⁹ Duffield, p. 23-24.

⁴⁰ Duffield, p. 24-25.

solidarity in alliances, need for harmony, multilateralism, moralism, delegitimization of power politics, and a forgotten reason of state.”⁴¹ According to Duffield:

German society as a whole, and German political elites in particular, can be characterized as possessing a distinctive, widely shared, and rather elaborate set of beliefs and values of potentially great relevance to national security policy, which were little altered by unification.⁴²

There is no question as to the seminal importance of Germany’s experience in the Second World War and the years immediately following, in shaping the beliefs and attitudes described by Schwarz and Duffield above. Germany’s negative World War II experiences with Nazi dictatorship and Wehrmacht excesses, as well as from the far more positive post-war experiences (including creating one of the world’s most stable democracies, pulling off the *Wirtschaftswunder*, and the ensuing German integration back into Europe via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Community) all served to create the distinctive and widely shared values that are Germany’s national security culture. These experiences were deeply internalized and became accepted by a substantial majority of the population, and have been passed on to subsequent generations through both formal education and informal socialization processes.

Germany’s experiences in the 20th century shaped its national security culture by changing the way in which Germans view their own country’s status and proper place in the world, by dramatically redefining the German national identity, and by generating strong and relatively clear feelings in Germany for anti-militarism and multilateralism. Before World War II, many Germans regarded their country as a great power that merited a substantial role in world affairs. But when Adolf Hitler took this idea to maniacal extremes, attitudes changed considerably. Today most Germans tend to down play their country’s

⁴¹ Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die gezähmten Deutschen—von der Machtversessenheit zur Machvergessenheit, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985).

⁴² Duffield, p. 61

international importance, at least when it comes to security affairs, with the dominant view being that Germany should limit its role to Europe. This attitude was plainly stated by former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt when he declared in 1995, "We are not a world power, and we have neither the capability nor the desire to be one."⁴³

Closely related to the less ambitious post-World War II self-image is the dramatic redefinition of the German national identity. Lead by Hitler's propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, the National Socialists twisted and brutally corrupted the idea of the German *Volks*, and as such what it meant to be German, to such an extent that it has taken Germans decades to rid themselves of this menace and replace this identity with a new less nationalistic, more transcendental one. This redefined national identity has acquired a dominantly Western orientation in which Germans see themselves as members of a larger European entity, strongly rooted in Western liberal democratic values and traditions. This decidedly European orientation has been described by former Chancellor Helmut Kohl as one of the foundations of German political culture.⁴⁴

But the process of redefining its national identity along less nationalistic lines has not been easy for Germany. Along the way, German society has become extremely sensitive to any public display of its connection to this most infamous period of German history. Examples include the controversy over the exhibition of a collection of World War II photographs staged by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research in 1995, or the decision of a Berlin publishing house not to publish a book about Nazi pornographic films and photos made during the war.⁴⁵ Lest one not forget the impact of the past upon the German armed forces, there is the case of German Special Forces Commander Brigadier General

⁴³ Helmut Schmidt, *Die Zeit*, 13 January 1995.

⁴⁴ Helmut Kohl, "Europas Standort in einer veränderten Welt," *Bulletin*, no. 12 (4 February 1994): p. 105.

⁴⁵ For a more complete discussion of this issue see Donald Abenheim's article "Image of the Wehrmacht in Federal German Society and in the Tradition of the Bundeswehr," The Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Occasional Paper #3, August 1999. Reference concerning the unpublished book, see "Publisher Drops Nazi Porno Book," Deutsche Welle World News, 5 February 2004, www.dw-world.de

Günzel who was fired for his outward support of a German member of parliament who was accused of making anti-Semitic comments in a public speech.⁴⁶ These examples speak to the power of political culture, national identity and the German need to exercise mastery over the past—*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*.

The final, yet very important, feature of German national security culture is the emphasis on anti-militarism and multilateralism. Taking up first the idea of anti-militarism, Harald Müller points out that well before unification took place, most Germans exhibited a “reluctance or, depending on the political camp, an open refusal to consider military means as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy.”⁴⁷ Since World War II, Germans have tended to see only the disadvantages and inefficacy of military action, viewing it as unlikely to be effective, risky, and even counterproductive.⁴⁸ Certainly this was the case during the Cold War, when the East German *Nationalen Volksarmee* and the Soviet Red Army were poised just across the border and the exclusive role of the Bundeswehr was national self-defense. But even after unification and the end of the Cold War, this highly restrictive view of Germany’s military role has continued and has considerable impact upon attempts to reform the Bundeswehr. Max Otte writes:

During basic training, Bundeswehr recruits, among them this writer, were regularly told that the sole mission of the Bundeswehr was a political one: to deter an attack. Many soldiers were convinced that if war broke out, it would mean that the Bundeswehr had failed.⁴⁹

Additionally, continued anti-militarism since the end of the Cold War has manifested itself in the broad concept of security that many Germans have espoused. This new broader concept of security has support from many of the leading politicians in Germany, especially in the ruling coalition of the SPD and

⁴⁶ “Top General Sacked as Anti-Semitism Scandal Spreads,” *Deutsche Welle World News*, 5 November 2003, www.dw-world.de

⁴⁷ Harald Müller, “German Foreign Policy After Unification.” In Paul B. Stares, ed., *The New Germany and the New Europe*, p. 162, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1992.

⁴⁸ James S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1998, p. 64.

⁴⁹ Otte, p. 30.

Green parties, and is best described in the comprehensive security concept document published by the SPD in the wake of unification:

Security can exist only on the basis of political, economic, social, and ecological cooperation, that is, as cooperative security leading to comprehensive, non-military conflict prevention and resolution, so that the military dimension becomes less important.⁵⁰

There is no doubt that in the minds of today's German leaders, "security is not just a military problem."⁵¹

Under the heading of multilateralism comes the idea that if an overly militarized society contributed to Germany's past transgressions, then equally to blame must be the tendency to use such militarism in a 'going-it-alone' or *Alleningänge*. Acting alone in world security affairs has only gotten Germany in trouble. Therefore, Germans have developed an overwhelming preference for acting multilaterally in world affairs. As one German commentator observed, "the burden of the past rules out categorically and forever any idea of Germany going it alone...The new Germany's flexibility for action...is paralyzed by memories of the past."⁵² Based on the negative experiences from World War II and on the good experiences with the allies and NATO during the post-war years, German leaders have determined that diplomatic isolation, insecurity and conflict are the results of unilateralism, while cooperation, security and peace are the results of multilateralism. During the critical years immediately following the war, strong men of character like Adenauer, Acheson, and Schuman showed the world, and their own countrymen, that there was an alternative to the *Realpolitik* that had resulted in two wars in the same century, and that the alternative could, in fact, yield far more advantages than the sum of its parts would suggest. Through the subsequent vehicles of the European Coal and Steel Community, Adenauer's policy of *Westbindung*, and finally the European Community (which would become the European Union), German leaders learned the value and necessity

⁵⁰ "Neue Perspektiven deutscher Außenpolitik," Zwischenbericht der Projektgruppe „Internationale Politik," Vorstand der SPD, Bonn, Germany, June 1992.

⁵¹ Hans-Ulrich Klose, address to the Bundestag, broadcast on ZDF, 13 Jan 1994, translation in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 13 Jan 1994, p. 15.

⁵² Adrian Zielcke, *German Tribune*, 25 Sept 1992.

of multilateralism which is forever more a defining characteristic of their political and strategic culture.

Today, some German leaders could almost be accused of seeing multilateralism as an unwritten constitutional principle.⁵³ Since World War II, Germany has become the leading proponent for European integration and since the end of the Cold War has acted almost exclusively through international or multilateral organizations in world affairs (NATO, OSCE, UN, etc.). This is evidenced by the statement of former German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel to the UN General Assembly in 1995: “the fundamental principle of German foreign policy...is to give priority to multilateral cooperation.”⁵⁴

2. External Factors

While the extremely influential effects of a nation’s political military culture can go a long way in explaining foreign and security policy, these internal factors alone are insufficient. Domestic factors like strategic culture, political parties, and public opinion must be interpreted along side a nation’s external operating environment in order to put these beliefs and attitudes into their proper, geopolitical context. Not only have those of the realist school recognized the importance of external realities in the making of a nation’s foreign and security policy. Regional or international crises that demand a response from great powers may certainly prompt realignment in foreign policy. Military invasions, civil wars, genocide, and humanitarian crises directly relate to a country’s foreign and security policy orientation and demand attention, and often prompt political debate on a proper response. It is for these reasons that Jeffrey Lantis calls such external shocks “strategic dilemmas.”⁵⁵ As such, strategic dilemmas (and more specifically, Germany’s reaction to them) make up the second factor which has determined Germany’s past foreign and security policy, and which also helps to account for the continuity seen in its post-Cold War actions.

⁵³ Josef Joffe, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 28 Mar 1991.

⁵⁴ Klaus Kinkel, speech at the fiftieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1995.

⁵⁵ Lantis, p. 6.

The Federal Republic was no longer the same political or geographical entity after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the years that followed the world began to undergo incredible political transformation which led to an equally transformed geopolitical landscape. For the newly united Germany, the strategic threats to its territory which had guided its foreign and security policy for decades simply disappeared, and even more interesting, several former enemies became partners via international institutions like NATO, the OSCE, and the EU. But the euphoria of November 1989 was, sadly, short lived. As one expert observer wrote, “the dissolution of the Soviet imperium has brought forth no ‘perpetual peace,’ as many had hoped in 1990-1991.”⁵⁶ Almost continually throughout the 1990s, Germany was faced with one strategic dilemma after another which forced its leaders, military establishment, and the general public to revisit the assumptions and norms that had driven German foreign policy for half a century.

The Persian Gulf crisis, beginning on 2 August 1990, presented Germany with its first strategic dilemma of the decade and could not have occurred at a more sensitive time.⁵⁷ Iraq invaded Kuwait just as the Federal Republic was entering into the final phase of negotiations for both the two-plus-four treaty on unification, and the bilateral German-Soviet treaty on the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from German soil.⁵⁸ This put German leaders in a very difficult position. They obviously considered the invasion itself a blatant violation of international law and felt an obligation to support not only the corresponding United Nations Security Council resolutions on the matter, but to show support for the United States as well. However, German leaders were also very conscious of Soviet and East German sensitivities concerning on-going negotiations and were keen not to make any moves which could upset this situation or the first all-German national elections scheduled for October 1990.⁵⁹ Additionally there was the

⁵⁶ Donald Abenheim, Foreword, *Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, December 1996, p. vi.

⁵⁷ Lantis, p. 21.

⁵⁸ Otte, p. 91.

⁵⁹ Otte, p.93.

constitutional question of sending Bundeswehr troops outside the traditional NATO area of operations. Key sections of the German Basic Law, Articles 24 and 87a, implied, according to the standard political interpretation of the Cold War, that German military action was limited to participation in regional, collective security institutions.⁶⁰ Most German leaders agreed that these articles of the Basic Law essentially barred the government from sending troops to the Persian Gulf. Germany's difficult position was exacerbated by personal requests for German troop deployments to the Persian Gulf by both the US President George Bush and US Secretary of State James Baker.⁶¹

Here one can clearly see the linkage between internal strategic culture influences (emphasis on alliance ties, solidarity, and multilateralism) and external operating environment considerations (emphasis on hard security threats and intentions of neighbors). On the one hand, Germany had realistic reasons for continuing its post-WW II and Cold War military doctrine of purely self-defense actions within an alliance context, and on the other hand, the Federal Republic was under considerable pressure to play a more active role in the new post-Cold War world of peacekeeping and international crisis management efforts. Compatibility and consensus had to be found between these two competing factors.

Given the urgency of the situation, German leaders agreed that they must respond in some way to the strategic dilemmas caused by the Iraqi invasion and subsequent US requests for material and financial assistance for military operations. Eighteen days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the German Chancellor, Foreign Minister, and Minister of Defense met to discuss the German response to the war, which in the words of Foreign Minister Genscher, "fit neither the political needs nor the mood of the people."⁶² Knowing that the time was not right to address the constitutional question of German troop deployment, and

⁶⁰ Lantis, p. 22.

⁶¹ Lantis, p. 20.

⁶² Statement of Foreign Minister Genscher on the meeting of the WEU and EPZ with respect to the situation at the Gulf, *Bulletin*, no. 102, 25 August 1990, pp. 858-860.

recognizing that 70% of the German public opposed direct German involvement, these leaders, along with their respective political party leaders, agreed on a compromise by mid-September 1990.⁶³ Germany would execute what is known as “checkbook diplomacy.” It was agreed that the Federal Republic would provide economic aid to those states most affected by the invasion, logistical and financial support for the military coalition aligned against Iraq but they would not send German troops to the region. All told, the German government committed a total of \$11.5 billion to the coalition effort—about one sixth of the total cost of all coalition efforts.⁶⁴ “This ‘checkbook diplomacy’ met with general approval inside Germany,” and reflected the consensus that financial and logistical support represented the limits of German actions based on established constitutional barriers.⁶⁵

While the CDU/FDP coalition government of Kohl and Genscher was able to find suitable compatibility and consensus in order to extricate itself from the Persian Gulf crisis, it was certainly only a foreshadowing of the further conflicts of the 1990s. Continued humanitarian crises around the world during this decade prompted legal, political, and moral debates in Germany that put the Gulf War compromise on the use of force to the test.⁶⁶ This test came in the form of the worsening humanitarian and political situation in the African country of Somalia in 1992-1993. The strategic dilemma of Somalia presented the German government, once again, with a conflict between its internal predispositions toward restraint and purely defensive military action and its external requirements to fulfill German responsibilities commensurate with being a mature and reliable member of the international system of states. Chancellor Kohl, along with his new Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and new Defense Minister Volker Rühe, were ready to accept the greater role offered to Germany by UN Secretary Boutros-Ghali and US President George Bush by early 1992, but many leading Liberal

⁶³ Lantis, p. 26.

⁶⁴ Ronald D. Asmus, *Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and International Reticence*, N-3522-AF, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), p. 14.

⁶⁵ *Der Spiegel*, 6 February 1991, p. 47.

⁶⁶ Lantis, p. 56.

members of his coalition government, not to mention the German public, were not prepared as yet to go along with him.

Just as in the Gulf War crisis, German leaders would have to find the acceptable range of consensus and compatibility between the newly emerging desire for Germany to take on a more leading role in global affairs and the traditional foreign policy of the *Mittellage*—restraint and circumspection. In this sense, the Somalia dilemma and ensuing debate over the constitutionality of deploying German troops served as a microcosm of the broader disagreements among decision makers and party leaders over the new course of German foreign and security policy.⁶⁷ As in 1991, the main debate centered on differing interpretations of Articles 24 and 87a of the Basic Law and its implications for Bundeswehr deployments and the use of force.

Just as it had during the Persian Gulf crisis, the Kohl government, backed by the conservative CDU/CSU party, supported sending Bundeswehr soldiers outside the traditional NATO area of responsibility for humanitarian missions and held that a constitutional amendment was not necessary. Some hard-line Conservatives even favored German participation in both multinational peacekeeping and peace-making operations under UN, NATO, or WEU auspices. Opposing Chancellor Kohl and Defense Minister R  he were the FDP (the junior partner in the coalition government) and the SPD. The FDP, led by new Foreign Minister and party leader Klaus Kinkel, supported the overall idea that Germany needed to take on a larger role in international security obligations (especially in UN sanctioned humanitarian efforts such as Somalia), but held firmly to the demand for a constitutional amendment allowing such deployments. The SPD believed in a much more narrow interpretation of the constitution and stated that any troop deployment to Somalia would be in violation of German Basic Law. A leading SPD party member and *Ministerpr  sident* of Schleswig-Holstein, Bjorn Engholm, demanded that the government enter into negotiations

⁶⁷ Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The German Bundeswehr in Out-of-Area Operations: To Engage or Not to Engage?" *The World Today*, vol. 4, p. 167.

to amend the Basic Law and promised that the SPD would contest any attempted troop deployment by the Kohl government in the Federal Constitutional Court.⁶⁸

These mixed political party positions concerning the Somalia mission and the constitutional issue of Bundeswehr deployments were accompanied by similarly mixed public opinions. Most Germans believed that their country should act in response to international humanitarian crises like Somalia, but they disagreed over the constitutionality of such actions and over the correct use of the Bundeswehr in response to them. In 1993, 95% of Germans said they supported some role in humanitarian missions, 53% favored German participation in UN peacekeeping missions, but only 18% said that Germany should participate in future Gulf War-like operations sanctioned by the UN.⁶⁹

The German government response to the Somalia crisis involved two simultaneous tracks. First, Conservative leaders realized they had to acknowledge domestic public and political opposition to any Bundeswehr deployment and decided to enter into negotiations with the opposition on amending the Basic Law. Second, Kohl and his cabinet leaders wanted to show their resolve to be a responsible member of the international community, and therefore moved ahead with plans to deploy about 1,600 Bundeswehr soldiers to Somalia as part of the UNOSOM II relief mission. The first track (agreeing to negotiations on amending the Basic Law) was pursued as a political necessity in order to keep the CDU-FDP ruling coalition at least outwardly united. The FDP has insisted on talks to amend the constitution before they would lend their support to any troop deployments. In exchange for their willingness to negotiate, the Conservatives obtained valuable concessions from the FDP—the proposed amendment would include a clause allowing German participation in future peacemaking operations under the UN, NATO, or even the WEU but would require a two-thirds majority vote from the Bundestag.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ "Tagesschau," Deutsche Fernsehen ARD, interview transcript from 17 December, 1992, BPA, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 17 December, 1992.

⁶⁹ Ronald D. Asmus, *German Strategy and Opinion after the Wall, 1990-1993*, (RAND: Santa Monica, CA 1994), pp. 17 and 63.

⁷⁰ Lantis, p. 64.

The opposition (SPD and Green parties) was open to limited Bundeswehr deployments for humanitarian missions under UN auspices, but was opposed to the government's broad range of contingencies for Bundeswehr deployments. The SPD publicly announced its opposition to the government's proposed amendment in January 1993, and offered their own narrow amendment in the Bundestag which did not make it past the first reading due to Conservative opposition.⁷¹ Among those speaking out against the government's proposal was future German Chancellor, then *Ministerpräsident* of Lower Saxony, Gerhard Schröder. Schröder felt that the Bundeswehr must be able to conduct peacekeeping missions, but that such missions had become too politically complicated for Germany. He said Germany needed time to find a "new identity" and solve its own problems after unification, and that the "government would be better off if it did not get involved in overseas adventures before the Constitutional Court decision."⁷²

Meanwhile, the pace of events in Somalia did not wait for German politicians to get their act together, and by April 1993 the UN Secretary General was urgently requesting the deployment of German troops to assist in the peacekeeping mission in Somalia.⁷³ This very public request brought the deployment question to a climax. Put in the language of internal-external linkages, the Kohl government was once again in the position of trying to come up with a foreign and security policy that addressed the external realities of Germany's position in the post-Cold War world and the internal political military culture that told Germans to stay out of the lime light and to avoid "overseas adventures."⁷⁴ In this case the government chose to give in to external realities and move ahead with troop deployments without a constitutional amendment, but in order to appease the opposition and public opinion they made this move

⁷¹ Lantis, p. 65.

⁷² Bela Anda interview with Gerhard Schröder, "Blauhelmeinsatz Kanzlerkandidat SPD," *Bild*, 19 April 1993, p. 1.

⁷³ Nina Ruge, "Boutros-Ghali: UN Needs Bundeswehr in Somalia," interview with UN Secretary General, Bonn, 23 June 1993.

⁷⁴ Bela Anda interview with Gerhard Schröder, "Blauhelmeinsatz Kanzlerkandidat SPD," *Bild*, 19 April 1993, p. 1.

through the Bundestag in the form of a request for parliamentary approval of German troop deployments to Somalia. On April 21, 1993, the cabinet leaders launched a public relations campaign to ensure the request received the best possible chance in the Bundestag. Foreign Minister Kinkel pledged that the troops would be deployed “in a pacified area,” and serve “purely humanitarian purposes.” He added, “German foreign policy has always been, and remains, a policy of peace.”⁷⁵ The initiative received a majority of support from the Bundestag despite the SPD and Green parties voting against the authorization and pledging to challenge the initiative in the Federal Constitutional Court.⁷⁶

At first it seemed as if the government had made the right choice. By late summer 1993, 1,700 German soldiers were committed to UNOSOM II and were engaged in a wide variety of tasks. Bundeswehr soldiers themselves felt good about making significant contributions to the war-torn country, and their work had earned Germany a “particularly high reputation” for participation in the humanitarian relief effort.⁷⁷ Even the talk of a constitutional amendment died down for the moment. But by October things in Somalia had taken a turn for the worse as three main events transpired to lead the German government to rethink the wisdom of the entire deployment. The first negative development was the age-old problem of “mission creep.” What had begun as a purely humanitarian relief effort had quickly become an operation to “assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia.” This mandate from the UN Security Council authorized forces there to seize weapons caches of the various warring clans, resulting in UN actions being perceived as taking sides with one clan against the others—the most dangerous situation peacekeepers can find themselves in. Ambushes and attacks on UN

⁷⁵ Klaus Kinkel, Bundestag Sternographischer Bericht 151 session, Bonn, 21 April 1993.

⁷⁶ *Deutschland Nachrichten*, 25 June 1993, p. 1.

⁷⁷ Quote from Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Heinrich Schenemann’s interview, “Bonn Now Questions Scope of Somalia Mission,” *Welt am Sonntag*, 17 October 1993, pp. 1-2.

convoys and peacekeepers became more frequent and claimed the lives of 46 UN soldiers between June and September 1993.⁷⁸

The second and third costly events occurred within two weeks of each other and combined to become the main catalyst behind German reevaluation of its commitment. On October 3, 1993, US soldiers launched a daring daylight raid into downtown Mogadishu to capture top generals from the Aideed clan. The resulting tragedy, where a day-long firefight through the streets of Mogadishu left 18 American soldiers dead and 75 wounded, has since then become the poster child for how humanitarian interventions can go disastrously wrong.⁷⁹ The immediate effect upon the Somalia mission was an announcement only 48 hours later by US President Bill Clinton of America's decision to withdraw all US forces from Somalia by March 1994.⁸⁰ This of course was a major blow to the other 16 countries participating in the operation and was followed two weeks later by the first ever killing of a German soldier on a UN peacekeeping mission. Although Medical Staff Sergeant Alexander Arndt was shot in Phnom Penh, Cambodia by an unknown assailant, the death received widespread media attention and had obvious implications for German political leaders in relation to the Somalia operation.⁸¹

These three events, and the subsequent outcry from the opposition and general public, put the Kohl government under tremendous pressure to rethink its original decision to allow external forces to guide their policy, and now found itself having to give in to internal domestic forces. Throughout October and early November 1993, SPD and Green party leaders called for the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Somalia and even the junior party in the governing coalition (the FDP) moderated its position to say that German troops should be recalled if new fighting erupted in the area where they were

⁷⁸ Samuel Makinda, "Somalia: From Humanitarian Intervention to Military Offensive," *The World Today*, vol. 49, no. 10, October 1993, pp. 184-186.

⁷⁹ This failed raid became the subject of several books and of a popular US film entitled "Blackhawk Down."

⁸⁰ Lantis, p. 70.

⁸¹ Lantis, pp. 69-70.

stationed.⁸² By late November, the question was no longer whether soldiers should be withdrawn from Somalia but when and how. After discussions with US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, it was clear that German troop withdrawals via the Mogadishu airport could be protected by US forces until March 31, 1994 but not a day longer.⁸³ Shortly before Christmas 1993, the German government announced that Bundeswehr troops would be removed from Somalia by the end of March.⁸⁴ But despite the gloomy atmosphere surrounding the entire Somalia operation and its unfortunate and abrupt end, German leaders like Defense Minister R  he saw the UNOSOM II mission as a profound and meaningful step for German foreign policy and in Germany's path toward a more leading role in international security affairs. His comments to returning Bundeswehr soldiers in March 1994 would have a strong influence on the future development of German responses to humanitarian crises:

Everything we did in Somalia was for humanitarian good. Your operation in Somalia was an investment in humanity, and also in the future of the Bundeswehr. Germany has proven its capabilities to be a responsible member of broader society. We are prepared for growing responsibilities in the world...⁸⁵

Although the Persian Gulf crisis and the Somalia episode were crucial first steps for Germany in the post-Cold War era, arguably the most serious strategic dilemmas facing the Federal Republic during the 1990s were the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. German leaders and politicians had gained valuable experience during the first two strategic dilemmas in learning how to balance external responsibilities and pressures with internal demands and influences. Their actions in response to the Persian Gulf and Somalia operations were experiments in finding an acceptable range of compatibility with the existing

⁸² "Somalia Troops Recall Possible," Berlin ADN, 15 June 1993, p. 27.

⁸³ "Somalia: Withdrawal to Start as Early as February," *Bild am Sonntag*, 28 November 1993, p. 5.

⁸⁴ "Bundeswehr to Leave Somalia by 31 March," Hamburg DPA, 20 December 1993.

⁸⁵ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Material f  r die Presse, "Ansprache des Bundesministers der Verteidigung Volker R  he, anl  sslich der Begr   ung und Au  erdienststellung des deutschen Unterst  tzungsverbandes Somalia am 23 M  rz in K  ln-Bonn," Bonn, 23 M  rz 1994.

international system and consensus among domestic political forces, in order to meld a coherent foreign and security policy. Many of these same leaders and politicians found themselves relying on these previous experiences when they once again struggled to restructure German foreign policy during the Bosnia crisis of 1994-1999. Although not without its share of differences, this time German officials were able to build a surprisingly strong political consensus for action in Bosnia over a four year period. As in the first two dilemmas, the story of Germany's political and policy actions during the Bosnia crisis confirms the importance of internal-external linkages in forming foreign policy and underscores once again the influence of political military culture on a nation's policy decisions.

As in the previous dilemmas, the vehicle for policy debate on the Bosnia crisis was the constitutionality of Bundeswehr troop deployments—this time the technical issue was German participation in UN and NATO military actions in the former Yugoslavia. By the time hearings began in April 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe had three past petitions concerning the out-of-area troop deployment issue to use as the basis for its decision: the July 1992 challenge by the SPD on the commitment of troops to the NATO-WEU naval embargo in the Adriatic; the SPD case against Bundeswehr deployments to Somalia in late 1992; and the SPD-FDP challenge of February 1993 over German involvement in AWACS monitoring missions over the Balkans.⁸⁶ Four months later, in July 1994, the Constitutional Court made its ruling in favor of the Kohl government's position. The court held that Article 24 of the Basic Law offered the best guidance on the out-of-area question and that German participation in international military operations outside NATO territory did not violate the constitution.⁸⁷ It ruled that the three previous deployments of German soldiers out-of-area mentioned above had not violated the constitution, and said that the Basic Law offered “a constitutional foundation for an assumption of

⁸⁶ Lantis, p. 108.

⁸⁷ “Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts über Verfassungsbeschwerden gegen internationale Einsätze der Bundeswehr, verkündet in Karlsruhe am 12 Juli 1994”, *Europa-Archiv*, 15 Folge 1994, pp. D427-D431.

responsibilities that are typically associated with membership of such a system of collective security.” Finally, the court ruled that the Bundeswehr could be deployed in “potential combat environments” so long as the government secured a simple majority vote of approval from the Bundestag.⁸⁸

The Constitutional Court ruling of July 1994 freed Germany from constitutionally mandated military abstention, but it raised a political dilemma at the same time. Although German troops are cleared to join international peace mission, the legal ruling does not necessarily translate into wider political and popular support in Germany for sending soldiers abroad.⁸⁹

This analysis of the court decision by Franz-Josef Meiers could not have been more correct. As Meiers goes on to point out, “The irony of the Karlsruhe decisions is that it has been greeted with far more caution within Germany—on both sides of the political spectrum—than among Germany’s allies.”⁹⁰ Despite their public praise and optimism about the court ruling, Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kinkel were more cautious when discussing the potential for Bundeswehr deployments to the Balkan crisis. Kinkel concluded, “I think that a mission of German soldiers in the former Yugoslavia will not find a majority because of the historical situation...”⁹¹ Even the more activist Defense Minister, Volker Rühe, showed uncharacteristic restraint when asked about the Bosnia question, saying Germany wanted to be part of the solution, not part of the problem (referring to the same historical connection as Kinkel).⁹²

⁸⁸ Craig R. Whitney, “Court Permits German Troops a Foreign Role,” *New York Times*, 13 July 1994, p. A1.

⁸⁹ Franz-Josef Meiers, “Germany’s Out-of-Area Dilemma,” *Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, December 1996, p. 8.

⁹⁰ Franz-Josef Meiers, “Germany’s Out-of-Area Dilemma,” *Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, December 1996, p. 9.

⁹¹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, WEU-94-137, 18 July 1994, p. 15-16.

⁹² „Bundesminister der Verteidigung Volker Rühe in einem Gespräch mit dem Wallstreet Journal Europe und dem Handelsblatt,“ 26 August 1994; reprinted in *Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, September 1994.

Considering such less than enthusiastic comments about Germany's willingness to flex its newfound muscle into the emerging Bosnia crisis, it is not surprising that the German government simply ignored the first request for German ECR-Tornado aircraft support to Bosnia from NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, US General George Joulwan in November 1994. This unusual maneuver on the part of the Kohl government reflects just how ill-prepared they were to define German foreign and security policy in the wake of the Karlsruhe decision.⁹³ One government official rationalized the non-response to NATO by saying General Joulwan had not sent the request through proper official channels and therefore it was not considered for formal action by the government.⁹⁴

The following month, December 1994, Joulwan made another request for German ECR-Tornado aircraft, this time via more formal channels making it impossible for the government to ignore. Looking for firm consensus among his coalition partners, the FDP, and knowing there were differing opinions among the opposition SPD, Kohl talked around the issue publicly until the December 20th cabinet meeting, at which the deployment issue was on the agenda.⁹⁵ As in the Somalia decision, the FDP and Kinkel decided to support the CDU/CSU position to send the requested aircraft citing the moral responsibility to support the NATO humanitarian relief flights over the coming winter.⁹⁶ This humanitarian rationale seemed to win over the opposition as well. Shortly after the cabinet decision, and just before the issue moved to the Bundestag for a vote, SPD Chairman Rudolf Scharping said his party would also support the deployment of aircraft to protect relief flights.⁹⁷ The vote in the Bundestag received a majority approval, including a larger than expected number of SPD votes in favor.

⁹³ Lantis, p. 113.

⁹⁴ Udo Bergdoll, "Aus Bonn ein vernebeltes Nein," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 8 December 1994, p. 1.

⁹⁵ Lantis, p. 115.

⁹⁶ "Interview with Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (FDP)," *Bild am Sonntag*, 19 December 1994.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

The German government felt it had lived up to their UN and NATO responsibility with the December vote, and was now able to see some favorable movement from the opposition SPD toward a more proactive stance in foreign and security affairs. But it did not take long for the situation on the ground in Bosnia to worsen and prompt yet another request for German support from the UN and NATO in May 1995. As discussions about Germany's role in the newly created UN-NATO Rapid Reaction Force continued (put together in order to rescue UN peacekeepers on the ground in Bosnia if needed)⁹⁸, the German domestic political and public trend of supporting humanitarian interventions began to grow. Helped along by mass media coverage of the genocide and severe suffering of the Bosnian people⁹⁹, a rather broad base of support for German intervention began to develop among the population, the German cabinet, and to a certain extent among both the SPD and Green parties. Notably for the Green party was the policy paper circulated by a member of the party board of directors, Joschka Fischer, calling for a more active German government role in promoting UN humanitarian and peace operations in the Balkans.¹⁰⁰

Although this growing feeling was guarded within all camps and was based on the condition that German forces not engage in combat (other than self-defense), it was enough to lead to a German commitment of support to the Rapid Reaction Force. In June 1995, the cabinet agreed on a support plan and forwarded the matter to the Bundestag for review. The plan called for the participation of approximately 1,500 Bundeswehr troops, including medical, logistical, and security personnel, as well as Tornado and transport aircraft support. The cost would be an estimated \$240 million to the German government.¹⁰¹ After two days of strong debate, and a firm stipulation that

⁹⁸ "Erklärung zur Lage im ehemaligen Jugoslawien," from the North Atlantic Council meeting on 30 May 1995 in the Netherlands, *Bulletin*, no. 48, 12 June 1995, p. 429.

⁹⁹ Specifically noteworthy was the coverage of the systematic genocide conducted against Bosnian Muslim men outside the town of Srebrenica in the spring of 1995.

¹⁰⁰ Lantis, p. 121.

¹⁰¹ "Kabinettsbeschluss über Bosnien-Einsatz einig," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 22 June 1995, p. 1.

German planes could only “protect and assist the UN Rapid Reaction Force when attacked,”¹⁰² the measure passed the Bundestag by a strong majority (386 to 258) on June 30, 1995.¹⁰³

Despite receiving a clear majority vote in the Bundestag, many members of the opposition and members of the general public had grave reservations about Germany’s new willingness to send armed forces abroad. But the June 30, 1995 decision was historic and, as stated by Chancellor Kohl, “a major turning point in foreign and defense policy.” While fortunately the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) plan was never fully implemented, Germany did provide increasing amounts of support to operations in the Balkans, including German ECR-Tornadoes participating in their first air strikes on Bosnian Serb military positions as part of a NATO operation on September 1, 1995. Although these flights were reconnaissance missions and did not drop ordinance, it was considered the country’s first combat mission since World War II.¹⁰⁴ In many respects, the decision to support the RRF was the first step in process of what some have called the normalization of German foreign and defense policy. The events of 1991-1995 had enabled the government to gradually consolidate support for an “entirely new security policy construct,” one which permitted out-of-area operations and lead to the Bundeswehr’s sizable participation (4,000 soldiers) in NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) later that year, and an in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996.¹⁰⁵

E. SUMMARY

This chapter has provided vivid evidence, in the form of the three strategic dilemmas examined, of the importance of both domestic constraints and external

¹⁰² Rühle quoted in Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenographischer Bericht*, 48th Session, Bonn, 30 June 1995, p. 4000.

¹⁰³ “Der Bundestag mit deutlicher Mehrheit für den Bosnien-Einsatz der Bundeswehr,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1 July 1995, p. 1.

¹⁰⁴ Franz-Josef Meiers, “Germany’s Out-of-Area Dilemma,” *Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, December 1996, p. 12.

¹⁰⁵ Lantis, p. 124.

pressures on the development of German foreign and security policy. It has highlighted the pivotal role of international crises as catalysts for German foreign and security policy change, and it has proven how domestic political conditions and constraints shape policy decisions. This linkage is the key to understanding Germany's evolution in foreign and defense policy since the end of the Cold War, and to understanding why Germany has continued to exhibit continuity and restraint in its actions. Such a model of external-internal linkages has proven extremely useful in understanding decision making inside the Federal Republic since 1991, and will likely be of continued usefulness in the future.

But in addition to proving the value of the linkages model, this chapter has also said something about the specific nature of German strategic culture and its impact upon the nature of German post-Cold War actions. The evolution of German security and defense policy is a testament to a successful "pattern of making-strategy-in-a-democracy which has been visible since the beginning of the republic in 1949."¹⁰⁶ Along the way Germans have acquired a distinctive set of values and beliefs about how a democratic nation should conduct defense and foreign policy which has served them well. This set of values and beliefs, better known as political military culture, has successfully guided the Federal Republic through the strategic dilemmas described in this chapter and will continue to do so in the future. It has been and will be successful because German political military culture promotes multilateral cooperation, values international security organizations, and seems to recognize the nexus between international events and domestic political exigencies. For Germany, this nexus has often involved discussions about the use of its armed forces and the government's doctrine on the use of force. In each of the case studies examined here, the Bundeswehr figured prominently in the course of German foreign policy and continues to do so today, as evidenced by the current debate over the transformation and future of the German armed forces. Therefore, it is to that subject the next chapter will turn.

¹⁰⁶ Donald Abenheim, Foreword, *Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, December 1996, p. vii.

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III. GERMAN MILITARY AND DEFENSE REFORMS

Transformation and reform are certainly not new topics for the German military establishment. Ever since the days of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, who were responsible for the fundamental reforms in the Prussian Army of the early 1800s, reform has been a central theme in the German armed forces.¹⁰⁷ The subsequent Reichswehr and Wehrmacht periods of German military history each saw their share of transformation and reform as well, although the results of which are not at all viewed as positively as those of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The efforts of Hans von Seeckt¹⁰⁸ to transform the small post-World War I Reichswehr into a large efficient military and political power did so without regard to the Versailles Treaty and with his own warped sense of civil-military relations. Then there are the even more negatively viewed actions of army leaders such as von Blomberg, von Reichenau, and Keitel, all of whom are now viewed as having a hand in allowing the Wehrmacht to become nothing more than Adolf Hitler's personal army during World War II.¹⁰⁹ In fact, it is the indelible images of these past events in Germany military history, positive and negative, that have contributed to the German strategic culture of today.

But in contrast to these images of the past, the creation of the Bundeswehr in 1956 opened a new chapter in Germany's already voluminous military history. This time the German armed forces (the Bundeswehr) were born of and inside the alliance structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and were created not for the sake of the Federal Republic; rather for the sake of the West.¹¹⁰ Therefore, its periodic reforms mirrored the major changes in Allied strategy which took place throughout the Cold War. NATO policies such

¹⁰⁷ Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, Oxford University Press, (New York: 1964), Chapter II.

¹⁰⁸ Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command, University Press of Kansas, (Lawrence: 2000), p. 5-7.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 17-36; 41-42.

¹¹⁰ Josef Isensee, "The Law and the Liberty of the German People," G4 in Dieter Wellershoff, ed., *Frieden ohne Macht*, (Bonn: Bouvier 1991) p.66.

as Forward Defense, Flexible Response, and Dual Track Strategy all required, and were followed by, at least some degree of Bundeswehr reform. But arguably the time of greatest Bundeswehr reform since its creation began after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and continues in the uncertain security environment of today. Today as in the past, a detailed examination of these reforms, and the pattern discerned in them, is warranted for three very compelling reasons. First, and especially in the case of Germany, a close look at the nature and scope of reform efforts can reveal a great deal about the relative impact of outside forces (such as NATO, the EU, and neighboring countries) upon German defense decisions. Second, it is mainly through a nation's military and defense apparatus that its strategic and political culture is made manifest for the world to see. Third, the relative success or failure of a nation to execute its planned reforms determines the amount of credibility accompanying that nation's professed security and defense policies. In realist terms, a nation's policy is only as good as its ability to carry it out.

But the difference between the Bundeswehr of today and the Prussian Army, the Reichswehr or the Wehrmacht of the past, is that the current attempts at Bundeswehr reform are being carried out inside the unique political and security culture of post-Cold War Germany as described in the previous chapter. Therefore, not only is the Bundeswehr influenced by such material factors as budget constraints, equipment modernization needs, and personnel numbers; but it is also heavily influenced by the negative legacy of the past-- the result of which has made Germans skeptical of military power and downright fearful of military influence inside their own government. Additionally, the latest series of Bundeswehr reforms are the most far reaching and fundamental in the organization's almost 50 year history. These reforms go to the very definition of the Bundeswehr, its purpose for existing, and tasks it must perform.

The monumental changes in Europe during the early 1990s, beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall and German unification in 1989 and ending with the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991, forced a drastic and fundamental change in the defense and security thinking of virtually every country in Europe and North

America. Perhaps nowhere else was the impact of these events felt more strongly than in Germany, a country that had been internally divided and on the front line of the Cold War for 48 years. Yet now, almost overnight, Germany was no longer divided, no longer faced the immediate threat of an armed invasion, and found itself needing to reduce military levels instead of increasing them. But German leaders were not afraid to tackle the issues confronting them as a result of these events. Almost from the moment that the first East German walked through the Brandenburg Gate from East to West Berlin on the night of 9 November 1989, the German Ministry of Defense has continually and systematically attempted to transform the German Armed Forces into a smaller, lighter, more capable and more technologically advanced force ready to meet the challenges of the new security environment. It is against this back drop, and with an appreciation for the political and cultural influences previously outlined, that this chapter examines the series of transformation efforts of the Bundeswehr since 1990.

A. “ARMEE DER EINHEIT” 1989-1992

The first series of post-Cold War German defense reforms were executed immediately following German unification, and reflect the mandated changes required by the German Unification Treaty of July 1990 which was set in force on 3 October of that same year. These first reforms were seen as a major part of the interrelated processes of German unification and Bundeswehr reform, with the main goals being the dissolution of the former East German National People’s Army (NPA) and the creation of what was called *der Armee der Einheit* (Army of Unity). The simultaneous integration of the NPA into the Bundeswehr and the required corresponding restructuring of the new Bundeswehr to meet treaty limits was, to say the least, a monumental human and organizational challenge. Almost overnight, former adversaries had to jointly assume responsibility for the same tasks: to protect the united democratic Germany and its allies, and to build up the Bundeswehr in the new *Länder* (former East

Germany).¹¹¹ Upon unification, there could only be one army in Germany, under the command of the Federal Minister of Defense as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (the Bundeswehr). The East German Ministry of Disarmament and Defense was dissolved, and the NPA units were disbanded step by step as new Bundeswehr units were raised comprising personnel from the Bundeswehr and the former NPA. The major tasks facing German leaders during this historic era were:

- Define the new role and mission of the Bundeswehr
- Adapt the German Armed Forces' capabilities to the new mission
- Integrate the new legal agreements associated with reunification (such as the Two-plus-Four Treaty and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty)
- Cope with the overwhelming costs associated with reunification
- Disband the East German National People's Army and properly dispose of its surplus armaments and equipment

In the three months between the signing of the Unification Treaty in July and its effective date in October, an entirely new regional Federal Armed Forces command (Eastern Command) was temporarily created in the Berlin suburb of Strausberg. Minister of Defense Gerhard Stoltenberg chose Lieutenant General Jörg Schönbohm to head this historic effort, and on 3 October 1990 (on day after the NPA was officially dissolved) he and 2,000 officers and noncommissioned officers of the Bundeswehr activated the Eastern Command of the Bundeswehr. Schönbohm and his unit were tasked with:

- Exercising command and control over the land, air and naval forces existing in the new Länder at the time
- Disbanding the agencies and units that did not fit into the future force structure
- Taking over and ensuring the safekeeping of the NPA material pending further use, destruction or any other form of disposal

¹¹¹ German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr, (Bonn, 1994) p. 15, para. 114.

- Establishing the envisaged decentralized command and control organization
- Supporting the withdrawal of Soviet forces¹¹²

Of these five daunting tasks, the two that occupied the preponderance of Eastern Command's time were the integration of the NPA into the Bundeswehr and the dismantling and disposal of East German arms and equipment. As of October 1990, there were approximately 90,000 former NPA soldiers and 48,000 former NPA civilian employees on the payroll, as well as approximately 2,285 East German military facilities such as barracks, storage areas, and training areas to be safeguarded and controlled. By the end of 1990, about 13,000 officers and 9,000 noncommissioned officers of the NPA had left the armed forces at their own request. Of those remaining, approximately 12,000 officers, 12,000 NCOs and 1,000 enlisted personnel applied for employment in the Bundeswehr as regular or temporary-career volunteers with an extended term of enlistment.¹¹³

Schönbohm understood the sensitivity and implications of his task to integrate the soldiers and civilians of East Germany into the Federal Republic, as evidenced by his very prudent remark, "We come not as confirmed winners, but as Germans to Germans."¹¹⁴ In accordance with the Unification Treaty, a "Suitability Test Board" was established by Eastern Command in order to determine the suitability for applicant officers to become regulars in the Bundeswehr. After screening, a total of 3,027 officers, 7,639 NCOs and 207 enlisted personnel were selected for continuing employment with extended terms of enlistment in the Bundeswehr. Additionally, extensive retraining and

¹¹² German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr, (Bonn, 1994) p.19, para. 128.

¹¹³ Ibid. p. 15-16.

¹¹⁴ German Federal Ministry of Defence, Armee der Einheit 1990-2000, (Bonn, 2000), p.14. <http://www.bundeswehr.de>

continuation training schemes in civilian professions were offered for servicemen leaving the former NPA.¹¹⁵

Of the 48,000 civilian employees of the former NPA, all of them were taken over by the Bundeswehr and reallocated to the services of the Bundeswehr and the Federal Defense Administration. Giving these personnel priority treatment when it came to filling civilian posts, combined with the requirement under Article 20 of the Unification Treaty to entrust public responsibilities to professional civil servants as soon as possible, meant that virtually all the civilian personnel were able to retain their jobs in one capacity or another. In similar fashion to the Suitability Test Board, special boards determined whether the candidates became professional civil servants or whether they had the qualifications for some other career.¹¹⁶

But this transformation and integration did not come without high financial costs. On 12 October 1990, the newly united Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on the Terms of the Temporary Presence and Arrangements for the Planned Withdrawal of the Soviet Forces from the Territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. This treaty covered all conceivable aspects of the transition of East Germany and was as detailed as its name implies. The treaty called for 90 percent (approximately 340,000 troops) of Soviet forces to be withdrawn from East Germany by the end of 1993, at a cost of 12 billion Deutsch Marks to the Federal Republic, spread out over four years. This included 3 billion for withdrawal, 7.8 billion for construction of housing, 200 million for retraining measures, and an interest-free loan of 3 billion to the Soviet Union.¹¹⁷

Then in December 1992, the Joint Declaration signed by Germany and the Soviet Union promised an additional 550 million Deutsch Marks for the reintegration and withdrawal of troops. On top of these figures came the cost of

¹¹⁵ German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr, (Bonn, 1994) p.16, para. 119.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. p.16, para. 121.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p 14.

dismantling NPA weapon systems, the renovation of some 600 former East German military facilities to be used by the Bundeswehr, and the environmental clean up of former East German training areas. These costs totaled approximately 21.8 billion Deutsch Marks just in the first three years alone.¹¹⁸ With these kinds of numbers involved (and not all costs are discussed here), it is not difficult to see how the enormous costs associated with German unification came to be, and still is today, an economic and political hot-button issue within Germany.

The fateful decision of the Kohl government not to raise taxes to finance the cost of unification had far reaching repercussions which were felt in virtually every cabinet office of the Federal Government, not the least of which was the Ministry of Defense.¹¹⁹ But during those first few critical years after unification, the euphoria of winning the Cold War, regaining national sovereignty and seeing the removal of the last major military threat to German territory, all combined to produce the expectation of what came to be called the 'peace dividend.' The logic was, quite understandably at the time, that the new and improved security environment would allow all major countries to come off of their Cold War footing, reduce military spending and force levels, and still maintain security.

While Germany was by no means the only European country to think this way in the early 1990s, it was certainly more tempting for Germans to adopt this line since they alone had to bear the added costs of unification, which by 1995 had resulted in a total public debt of approximately DM 2 trillion or 50% of Germany's gross domestic product.¹²⁰ Indeed, the immediate decline in defense spending in 1992-93 began a slide that did not stop until 2002. With only a slight exception in 1999, Germany has cut its overall defense spending from 1992 to 2002 by an average of nearly 10 percent. In real terms, Germany's defense

¹¹⁸ Ibid. p. 14-17.

¹¹⁹ For a more detailed discussion of the impact of this decision, see James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 56.

¹²⁰ Ibid. p. 56.

budget went from approximately 27 billion Euros in 1991 down to 24.1 billion Euros for 2002.¹²¹

This altered world also brought structural changes to the Bundeswehr that have continued in a step-wise regression over the last 13 years. In terms of personnel and material, the vast majority of the early cuts were mandated under the various treaties associated with the end of the Cold War. The CFE Treaty called for an approximate 53% reduction in the amount of weapons and armaments belonging to unified Germany and a reduction of approximately 80,000 personnel, giving the Bundeswehr a total strength of about 340,000 in 1995.¹²² But the cuts did not stop once treaty limits were reached. As will be discussed below, pressure to cash in on the 'peace dividend' and growing financial concerns continue to force subsequent cuts to Germany's armed forces through to the present day.

B. 1992 REFORMS

The tendency to reduce the armed forces in both personnel and material can be viewed as a logical response to the situation facing Europe in the 1990s, and quite frankly, for both strategic and financial reasons cuts had to be made. However, the great difficulty comes in the face of an unrealized 'peace dividend' and the resulting increase in failed states, ethnic violence, and humanitarian crises around the world. The reality of the new post-Cold War security environment did not mesh with the 'peace dividend' theory. Already by 1992, this reality was beginning to sink into the minds of those in the defense ministry. The 1992 Defense Policy Guidelines published by the Germany Ministry of Defense, recognized that the new post-Cold War world is not necessarily a safer world, and was one of the first attempts by the German government to outline the new

¹²¹ German Federal Ministry of Defence, The Bundeswehr in 2002, Current Situation and Perspectives, (Berlin, 2002), p. 44; Jane's Security Sentinel Security Assessment-Western Europe, 21 Jul 2003. <http://www.janes.com>

¹²² German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr, (Bonn, 1994)

security situation facing the country, as well as to address the probable impact upon the armed forces (the Bundeswehr).

Closely related to what Americans call National Security Strategy, the November 1992 DPG (Defense Policy Guidelines) was a very astutely written document considering the amount of flux and confusion in the world at that time. It outlined Germany's national security interests, addressed the challenges of the future in a chapter called "Opportunities and Risks," and described the tasks and responsibilities of the new post-Cold War Bundeswehr.¹²³ The 1992 DPG reflected the uncertainty of the times in which it was written, and its language was clearly influenced by the now firmly rooted German strategic and political culture. On the one hand, it proudly stated that, "For Germany, the existential threat of the Cold War has been irreversibly overcome." But on the other hand, it warned that social, ethnic, religious, and environmental crisis and conflict in Europe is still possible, and such conflict could "quickly appear and escalate regionally."¹²⁴ It also contained a paradox reflective of both German strategic culture and the reality of world events; namely that the document listed "Equal partnership between Europe and North America..." as one of Germany's main security interests; yet in the previous section it recognized that "German interests will not always coincide in every detail with those of the Allies and other partners..." This is a clear reference to the 1991 Gulf War in which Germany did not see eye to eye with the United States.

Here one can plainly see the often times conflicting influence of German strategic culture on national security policy. On one side, the 1992 DPG is filled with references to the Allies and partners; frequently mentions the need for more cooperation and integration; and clearly admits that the USA is essential to German and European security. Such language is evidence of the strong German desire to always seek multilateral solutions and to remain loyal to one's allies. However, an equally strong cultural principal is the belief that armed conflict and war should be absolutely the last resort, and then only undertaken

¹²³ German Ministry of Defense, *Defense Policy Guidelines*, (Bonn, 1992) p.1

¹²⁴ German Ministry of Defense, *Defense Policy Guidelines*, (Bonn, 1992) p.5

under the proviso of the appropriate international security organization. In the case of the 1991 Gulf War, these two areas of German strategic culture came in conflict with one another. The fact that the UN Security Council sanctioned coalition actions against Iraq, and the fact that the USA is one of Germany's most important allies made German support for the Gulf War a virtual requirement. As the Kohl government put it, there can be no compromise with the principles of international law.¹²⁵

But this loyalty came into conflict with the cultural belief that every non-military option must be exhausted before military force is used, as is evidenced in the 1992 DPG passage concerning German interests not always completely coinciding with those of the Allies. In the case of the 1991 Gulf War, Germany felt all diplomatic means had not been exhausted to force an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. In fact, the German Foreign Minister at the time argued right up to the last minute that war was not inevitable and that diplomacy should be given another chance.¹²⁶ In the end, Germany found a compromise between the two sides and made very significant but low-key contributions to the UN sanctioned effort against Iraq. Germany covered almost 10% of the total expenditure arising from the international response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and more than 12% of the military expenses incurred by the United States, levels of assistance that were exceeded only by those of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Japan.¹²⁷ This issue of an apparent conflict between two related but in reality different aspects of German national security culture was to only get more pronounced and complex in the coming years.

How Germany dealt with allied security issues was not the only difficult issue addressed in the 1992 DPG. No longer faced with the threat of an East German or Soviet invasion, Germany was now free to contemplate the

¹²⁵ James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1998, p. 179.

¹²⁶ Ibid. p.179.

¹²⁷ Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, *Deutschland und der Irak-Konflikt*, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik 68, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn, February 1992, p.55.

Bundeswehr's role in foreign and security policy and how it would come to grips with the ever increasing demand for Bundeswehr deployments outside of German territory. This meant dealing with two major forces that were often times at odds with each other. On one side was the domestic pressure coming from key political parties such as the social democrats, the free democrats, and the Green party to realize the 'peace dividends' of the end of the Cold War, and to reduce the size of the armed forces while cutting defense spending. On the other side were the external pressures coming from NATO (especially the US), the UN, and the European Union to take on a greater role in responding to the increasingly uncertain and dangerous post-Cold War world of failed states, terrorism, and non-state actors. The difficulty of this issue was not lost on the Ministry of Defense and Bundeswehr leaders. In 1991 the future German Defense Minister (who was currently the General Secretary for the Christian Democratic party) Volker Rühe acknowledged, "the Gulf War casts a bright light on the need to redefine united Germany's international role, particularly insofar as our readiness to commit our forces beyond the NATO area is concerned."¹²⁸ For their part, they knew the Bundeswehr needed more modern agile forces that could deploy outside of the immediate area, and they knew there was precious little money for it.

To that end, Germany's new Defense Minister Volker Rühe gave the Bundestag (the German parliament) a clear example of where he would take the new Bundeswehr in his speech to that body in September 1992;

Our allies expect us to show the same solidarity that we were shown every day for decades in the face of an acute and existential threat...[Thus] in the future, Germany must be ready to defend the alliance and other nations in the alliance area—just as others were ready to do for Germany for 40 years.¹²⁹

But this would prove to be a tough sell in some to some areas of the German body politic. By far Rühe's primary and most difficult task was to redefine the

¹²⁸ Interview in *Spiegel*, 18 February 1991, 24-27, translation in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 27 February 1991.

¹²⁹ Interview from German Television, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF), 9 September 1992, translation in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 10 September 1992, p. 16-17.

missions of Germany's armed forces, taking into account the fundamentally altered geopolitical circumstances, and then to restructure the Bundeswehr so as to best carry out its redefined missions in a way that was acceptable to the German government and the German people. The language of R  he's 1992 Defense Policy Guidelines reflects his attempt to carry out the needed transformation of the German armed forces, but to do so in a way that was still firmly grounded in the principles of German national security culture.

In redefining the missions of the Bundeswehr, R  he's Ministry of Defense still conceived of the Bundeswehr primarily as an alliance army, not an instrument for independent military action by the Federal Republic. Accordingly, the 1992 DPG stated that the defense of Germany will always mean defense within the context of its allies, especially NATO. It acknowledged that the, "long-term effects of the change in the world security environment are not yet fully known," and for this reason the number one task for the Bundeswehr is still, "to protect Germany and its citizens from external danger and oppression."¹³⁰ However, the underlying context of this language included the idea that Germany must be able to protect its allies wherever they might be located, and introduced the term "extended national defense." This idea was clearly recognition of the recent pressures Germany had felt from the UN and NATO during the 1991 Gulf War, and the growing concern for the situation in the former Soviet Republics of Eastern Europe. Accordingly, two additional tasks of the Bundeswehr were to promote military stability and integration of Europe, and to serve world peace and international security as charged by the United Nations charter.¹³¹ The document also opened Germany up to the growing realization that, "Europe must develop the capability to be a shaping power and global actor," and as such, "A part of the German armed forces must be able to execute deployments outside of Germany."¹³² R  he argued that the ability to carry out these new missions were vital to Germany's ability to be part of an alliance (*B  ndnisf  higkeit*), which was

¹³⁰ German Ministry of Defense, *Defense Policy Guidelines*, (Bonn, November 1992) p.11.

¹³¹ Ibid. p11.

¹³² German Ministry of Defense, *Defense Policy Guidelines*, (Bonn, 1992) p.9.

equally essential to its security, and moreover, that the maintenance of adequate armed forces was regarded as an important determinant of Germany's ability to exert influence.¹³³

In order to best carry out these new missions, and in response to the reality of a shrinking defense budget, the Bundeswehr had to be reduced in both size and structure. As has already been addressed, after unification and in accordance with the CFE Treaty the peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr fell to 340,000 personnel by 1994-95. This constituted an almost two-thirds cut from its Cold War size, and a cut in wartime strength following mobilization of approximately one-half. Overall, these reductions were seen simply as a pragmatic reaction to the reduced threat picture, and the need to cut costs in light of the enormous financial obligations to the new *Länder* (former East Germany). But unfortunately, since personnel costs in a conscript army are virtually fixed, and because the Ministry of Defense did not want readiness standards to slip too far, the personnel reductions did not really save Germany much money. Instead, the majority of the needed savings were taken out of the investment share of the defense budget, which includes research, development, procurement, and infrastructure. In the end, efforts to further reduce the armed forces down to around 300,000 were successfully resisted by using the argument that further reductions would not allow the Bundeswehr to accommodate all of the available conscripts (otherwise questions of equity in the draft would arise). Incidentally, in an effort to meet the final reduced end strength in an equitable manner, the duration of compulsory military service was reduced from 12 to 10 months in 1994.

In addition to being reduced in size, the Bundeswehr was fundamentally restructured in the 1992 Policy Guidelines, a far more radical and controversial issue than simply overall force reductions. The plan called for the entire armed forces to be restructured into two main components: the main defense forces

¹³³James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1998, p. 148.

(*Hauptverteidigungskräfte* or HVK) which were intended primarily for national defense and would require significant mobilization to be combat ready; and the smaller crisis reaction forces (*Krisenreaktionskräfte* or KRK) which were to be used for the full spectrum of alliance defense, crisis management, and international peace missions. This restructuring was in line with the latest NATO doctrine and the new 1991 Strategic Concept. The KRK would consist of about 50,000 troops from all three services, 75-80% of which would be professional soldiers, and be fully ready and quickly deployable outside Germany. The HVK would make up the remainder of the armed forces, but would be subdivided into units at varying levels of readiness, some being allowed to defer operational readiness and some consisting only mainly of cadre, in order to save money.¹³⁴

This marked a quite significant change from the way the Bundeswehr had been organized during the Cold War. In the 1980s, the German Field Army of 12 divisions and 36 fully manned combat brigades was poised to repel a Warsaw Pact invasion on short notice. Additionally, there was the Territorial Army (TA) of 12 brigades which were partially manned or served as equipment holding units in peacetime, but would be fully mobilized in case of combat. Under the 1992 plan, the Field Army and Territorial Army were to be consolidated, with the number of divisions cut from 12 to 8 and the total number of brigades cut from 48 to 28. Seven of these brigades (three mechanized, two airborne, one mountain, and the German portion of the Franco-German brigade) would be fully manned and constitute the army's contribution to the KRK. Similarly drastic cuts were made to the air force and the navy. The air force would go from 620 combat aircraft in 28 squadrons to less than 500 aircraft in 20 squadrons. The navy would lose almost 50% of its vessels, leaving a total of 80 or 90, but the number of destroyers and frigates would remain roughly the same. Six of the remaining air

¹³⁴ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Militärpolitische und militärstrategische Grundlagen und konzeptionelle Grundrichtung der Neugestaltung der Bundeswehr*, Vorlage des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung an den Verteidigungsausschuß des Bundestages vom 20 Januar 1992. Reprinted in *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, no. 4 (April 1992), p. 506-10.

force squadrons and approximately 40% of the remaining navy would be organized into the KRK.¹³⁵

Unfortunately for R  he and for Germany, the pace of world events did not slow down to allow for German defense restructuring. The very types of incidents and instability which were feared by most western governments, and which had been the anticipated threat driving German defense reform, were breaking out all around the world in record numbers. The so-called new world *disorder* was very quickly proving to be every bit as challenging, albeit in different ways, as the previous Cold War bi-polar world. From the end of the Second World War until the beginning of 1988, a mere thirteen peacekeeping missions were conducted by the UN. At the beginning of 1993, more than 80,000 “Blue Helmets” from 70 states were employed in a total of thirteen UN peacekeeping missions, and a newly united Germany was now being pressured to do its part. By the end of 1992, the Bundeswehr found itself with troops and medical units deployed in Cambodia, airlift operations in Sarajevo, and similar units taking part in the humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia. Additionally, German units were still participating in the ongoing Kurdish relief operation in Turkey and Iran, and were supporting UNSCOM operations in Iraq.¹³⁶ This assumption of a growing international military role created a fundamental debate among German leaders and policy makers that would play a central role in Bundeswehr reform efforts for the next several years, and one that would involve two conflicting principles of German strategic culture.

The central questions surrounding what is known as the ‘out of area debate’ were: In what types of military actions should the Bundeswehr be able to participate? Was a constitutional amendment required? How should decisions regarding the use of German armed forces be made? German leaders struggled to come to grips with these questions at a time when the last elements of Soviet forces were still leaving German territory; the Bundeswehr was still integrating

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr, (Bonn, 1994)

the remainder of the East German National People's Army as well as execute the 1992 restructuring plan outlined above; and the main focus of German foreign policy was the stability of Eastern Europe. Germany's response to these challenges and efforts to answer the questions surrounding the out of area debate was highly influenced by its prevailing, yet at times conflicting, national security culture. The Bundeswehr's participation in several international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions around the world showed Germany's willingness to live up to its international commitments and to be a reliable partner, which was an important aspect of German national security culture. But at the same time, the substantial reluctance and reservation of many politicians to engage in these activities reveals another aspect of German national security culture; a preference to maintain a low profile in international security issues and to refrain from the use of military force as much as possible, especially when the actual territory of Germany is not directly threatened.

The central issue in the debate over how Germany should respond to out of area crises and conflicts revolved around the interpretation of the German constitution, or Basic Law, in so far as the armed forces are concerned. Article 26 of the Basic Law contains an explicit ban on preparations for military aggression. Article 24 allows Germany to, "become a party to a system of collective security," and consents to, "such limitations on its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world." Finally, Article 87a states that the armed forces are to be for defense purposes, and that "other than for defense purposes the Armed Forces may only be employed to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law." As one might imagine, these rather ambiguous and somewhat contradictory provisions lent themselves to a wide range of interpretations. The highly restrictive interpretation of the law, centering on Article 87a, would allow the Bundeswehr to be used only for the defense of German territory, but this position conflicted with the mutual defense obligations Germany had undertaken as a member of NATO and the Western European Union. The other extreme interpretation, centering on Article 24, would allow German participation in any

act of individual or collective self-defense as provided for in Article 51 of the UN charter, which Germany had been a party to since the early 1970s. Obviously either one of these interpretations had tremendous impact upon the Bundeswehr's missions, tasks, and structure.

Over the years, a strong cross-party consensus had developed on an interpretation of the Law which held that the Bundeswehr could be used for the defense of Germany and its allies but not for any other military purpose (strictly humanitarian missions were permitted as part of an international organization). During the Cold War, the biggest reason for this interpretation was the fear that German military involvement in out of area conflicts could lead to a direct clash with East German forces or provoke Soviet retaliation in Central Europe.¹³⁷ Therefore, the situation now facing Germany was much different than during the Cold War and the debate over the need for a constitutional amendment to allow German involvement in the type of missions now being demanded was reopened.

In July 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court issued a landmark ruling which effectively lifted the alleged constitutional restrictions on the employment of German armed forces outside of German territory. The court ruled that the constitution did not prohibit the deployment of German troops outside the NATO area, but under the principle of democratic civilian control of the armed forces, the Bundestag (German parliament) must still approve the deployment and the mission must be under the auspices of an alliance structure to which Germany was a party (the UN, NATO, WEU, etc.). But despite this decision, no profound policy change was produced as a result. Even when the violence erupted in the Balkans in late 1994, Germany was still unsure of exactly how to handle the series of allied requests for German peacekeeping contributions. Ultimately the Bundeswehr did participate, but did so with numerous self-imposed conditions and limitations.¹³⁸ This goes to show that the issues surrounding this debate are

¹³⁷James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1998 p.176.

¹³⁸ Ibid. p.174.

more cultural than legal. In fact, this constitutional question is still a thorn in the side of the Bundeswehr as was evidenced at the October 2003 NATO Informal Meeting of Defense Ministers in Colorado Springs when, in executing a NATO simulation exercise, German Defense Minister Struck had to suspend his forces activities in the exercise until notional approval from the Bundestag had been obtained for the simulated commitment of German forces to the conflict.¹³⁹

C. COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE NEW ENVIRONMENT 1993-1999

A multitude of forces, both internal and external, continued to influence the course of Bundeswehr reform efforts throughout the rest of the 1990s. In the realm of external influences, the two major players that had the most effect upon Germany's plans were the European Union and NATO. In the landmark 1993 Treaty on European Union, commonly called the Maastricht Treaty, the EU announced its intention to expand beyond its economic and judicial efforts and get into the defense and security business. In Title V, Article J.1 of the treaty, the Union stated it, "shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy...covering all areas of foreign and security policy," (which came to be referred to as CFSP). Article J.4, although also vague, stated, "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence."¹⁴⁰ Although Maastricht was just the infant stages of CFSP development, the EU had taken a large step toward the idea of developing defense and military capabilities of its own, an idea which would be met with a great deal of controversy in the coming years. While the immediate impact of the CFSP idea upon Germany's defense reforms was not that substantial, it would become so in the near future and it did add one more issue to an already complicated political situation. Specifically for the Bundeswehr, the

¹³⁹ *Spiegel*, "New tasks, new course", 13 October 2003, extracted from the NATO Daily Enlargement Brief, 14 October 2003, available at nato@topica.com

¹⁴⁰ The actual Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) is dated as 7 February 1992 but did not go into effect until 1993, the year commonly cited as the establishment of the European Union. The full text of the Maastricht Treaty is available at http://uni-mannheim.de/users/ddz/edz/doku/vertrag/engl/m_engl.html

notion that German armed forces may in the future become obligated to yet another collective defense organization could not have been the best news. The Bundeswehr was already facing the need to be able to simultaneously send forces to both a NATO and UN contingency mission; a requirement that would become official doctrine in the 1994 White Paper published by the Ministry of Defense.

The other major external influence on current and future Bundeswehr reforms was, not unexpectedly, NATO. It goes without saying that NATO has heavily influenced the Bundeswehr since its creation in 1956. Germany agreed to nest the overall command structure of the Bundeswehr underneath NATO Supreme Command and has always been extremely responsive to NATO in terms of overall armament and strategy concepts. This arrangement served Germany and NATO well during the Cold War when the mission was almost exclusively territorial defense. However, by the 1990s it was obvious that a lot had changed. Only four months after the Constitutional Court's decision on Bundeswehr deployments, NATO asked Germany to participate in its growing involvement in the Balkans, specifically they asked for six to eight ECR-Tornado combat aircraft (for radar suppression and reconnaissance)¹⁴¹ to help enforce the UN flight ban over Bosnia. While the German government was wrestling with obtaining Bundestag approval to provide the requested assistance, the situation became more complex in June 1995 when NATO was faced with putting together a Rapid Reaction Force in order to protect a possible redeployment of the UN forces in Bosnia. This time the government obtained a substantial majority in the Bundestag allowing the Bundeswehr to offer some 1,800 troops plus the previously requested aircraft, but the cultural tendency of restraint was still very much present, forcing the government to insist that no German forces be

¹⁴¹ Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Unification, Praeger Publishers, (Westport: 2002), p. 112-113.

stationed in the former Yugoslav territory and that the aircraft be used only to protect the Rapid Reaction Force.¹⁴²

By the time NATO was ready to send in troops to implement the measures of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995 (called Implementation Force, or IFOR), the German government had been able to frame the situation in the Balkans as a mission required to prevent war, not wage it. This argument won over most of the opposition leaders and the Bundestag approved Germany's participation in both IFOR, and one year later in SFOR, by an overwhelming majority. The huge success of these NATO missions, and the superb performance of Bundeswehr troops during them, was a turning point for Germany's foreign and defence policy and was a defining moment for its national security culture. IFOR was the largest operation abroad in the history of the Bundeswehr, and SFOR saw the stationing of German troops inside Bosnia as a full and equal participant in the operation. Despite the many limitations and restrictions still placed on Germany's involvement in both missions, it was none the less a defeat for those in Germany that feared the presence of German troops would only exacerbate the situation and who did not think it was appropriate for the Bundeswehr to take on such a high profile military role in the world. Germany could now be a part of the solution, not the problem.¹⁴³

The other critical influence of NATO upon the Bundeswehr during the late 1990s was through the issues of "burden sharing" and "the capabilities gap." While the burden sharing debate is certainly not new within NATO, it gained considerable attention as a result of NATO operations in the Balkans, especially after the Kosovo air war in 1999. In brief, burden sharing refers to the rather one-sided situation that developed out of the Cold War when the United States' nuclear arsenal and more mobile conventional forces carried the lion's share of the defense burden for Europe. During the some forty years of the Cold War,

¹⁴² *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 June 1995 p.1, translation in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 5 June 1995, p.18; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3-5 June 1995, p.7, translation in FBIS, 6 June 1995, p.3.

¹⁴³ James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1998 p.216-17.

most European nations stuck predominantly to static territorial defense and did not develop any major nuclear weapons capability. This situation also simultaneously resulted in what is known as the capabilities gap. During the Cold War, most European defense budgets remained substantially higher than they would be afterwards, but due to nature of the mission this money was not devoted to developing the latest technologically advanced equipment, nor towards obtaining strategic lift capabilities to move their forces. Therefore by the late 1990s, increasing activities by United States forces around the world and the number of NATO activities in the Balkans left many asking, including the NATO Secretary General at the time, why the Europeans can not shoulder a bigger share of the load and wondering where would they be without the United States?

For Germany and the Bundeswehr, these questions could not have come at a worse time. The 1994 defense policy guidelines called for even more cuts to the overall size and structure of the armed forces that was laid out in 1992. The army would be reduced to just seven divisions and 22 combat brigades, with only six instead of seven of the brigades being devoted to the crisis reaction forces (KRK). Additionally, Defense Minister R  he was troubled by the escalating costs of the proposed Eurofighter aircraft that was intended to replace Germany's aging fleet of F-4 Phantom aircraft, forcing him to push for a 30% cheaper version called Eurofighter 2000.¹⁴⁴ Financial constraints continued to get tighter in 1996 when another 51.1 million Euros were unexpectedly cut from an already shrinking defense budget, the entire amount coming out of the investment portion.¹⁴⁵ All of this meant that if anything, the ability for Germany to close the capabilities gap was getting worse not better.

The internal influences upon the Bundeswehr in the mid to late 1990s were no less important than the external. As eluded to earlier, the requirement for the Bundeswehr to conduct an increasing number of deployments outside of Germany revealed the need for an independent national command and control element for the Bundeswehr, which had been previously nonexistent due to

¹⁴⁴ *Agence France Presse*, 10 December 1992, translation in FBIS, 10 December 1992, p.3.

¹⁴⁵ *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 26 June 1996, p.11.

NATO command and control arrangements. Given Germany's past history, this need was much more easily stated than resolved. German officials had to be sensitive to the fact that any establishment of an autonomous national command authority would undoubtedly renew memories of Wehrmacht excesses and of the dubious control of the Prussian General Staff. Wary of this fact, German leaders proceeded with caution and addressed the problem on two levels. First, the operational command capabilities of the individual services were expanded. Since the air force and the navy already had operational command headquarters of their own, the army established the Army Operations Command (*Heeresführungskommando*) in Koblenz which was activated in 1994. The army could now conduct independent operations above the corps level.¹⁴⁶

Second, the Ministry of Defense established a very small operational staff (*Einsatzführung Bundeswehr*) and a coordination staff for operational tasks (*Koordinierungsstab für Einsatzaufgaben*) within a section of the existing Joint Staff in 1993. This purposefully low-key move gave the *Generalinspekteur*, who heads the Joint Staff, the ability to coordinate military deployments, but was in reality inadequate to properly plan and coordinate joint operations. Consequently, in 1995 a small central command center (*Führungszentrum*) was set up also within the Joint Staff. This command center was responsible for both planning and coordinating joint Bundeswehr operations while informing and advising the Minister of Defense around the clock. But even these very slow and incremental moves were met by charges from the press of creating the first General Staff in Bundeswehr history. A fact that no doubt had an impact upon the government because even these modest command and control changes were not improved upon for some years to come, despite the obvious limitations they presented for the Joint Staff.¹⁴⁷

The second internal influence that, perhaps more than any other, limited the shape and pace of Bundeswehr reform was the worsening financial picture of

¹⁴⁶ Thomas-Durell Young, "German National Command Structures After Unification: A New German General Staff?" *Armed Forces and Society* 22, no. 3 (Spring 1996), p.17-18

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 19-21.

the late 1990s. Ministry of Defense publications, such as the 1994 White Paper, called for the need to streamline, economize, and further cut costs throughout the 1990s. This led to large cuts in the German arms industry and to even less money for the investment portion of the defense budget. "By the end of 1993, according to one official estimate, cuts in the investment budget had already caused the loss of half of the 280,000 jobs in the German arms industry, and another 40,000 to 60,000 positions were threatened."¹⁴⁸ The 1994 White Paper noted that the Bundeswehr "will not need much new material in the 1990s."¹⁴⁹ One can only speculate if this statement is less a recognition of the state of the Bundeswehr's equipment, and more a result of the 358 million Euro cost of Germany's participation in IFOR.¹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, things would continue to worsen financially until 1997 when the German defense budget bottomed out at 23.6 billion Euros.¹⁵¹

D. THE SPD TAKES OVER

During the rather tumultuous years between the publication of the 1994 White Paper and the German national elections in 1998, no official document along the lines of a White Paper or Defense Policy Guidelines was published. The Ministry of Defense, which was sufficiently occupied dealing with the already prescribed reforms at the same time as the Bundeswehr was engaged in the Balkans, did manage to submit more than one draft of proposed doctrinal changes for the new Bundeswehr, but these efforts never made it past the politicians who were still not ready to commit themselves to any one given direction in such a fluid and fast moving environment. But 1999 saw a flurry of activity in the realm of German and European security and defense policy. The first Social Democrat since 1983 was elected to the Chancellorship in 1998 in the person of Gerhard

¹⁴⁸ *Berliner Zeitung*, 4 May 1995, p. 2, translation in FBIS, 6 June 1995, p.12.

¹⁴⁹ German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr, (Bonn, 1994) p.99.

¹⁵⁰ *Spiegel*, interview with R  he, 15 April 1996, reprinted in *Welt*, 7 November 1996, translation in FBIS, 8 November 1996.

¹⁵¹ German Federal Ministry of Defence, The Bundeswehr in 2002, Current Situation and Perspectives, (Berlin, 2002), p. 44.

Schröder (under the so-called Red/Green coalition of the SPD and Green Parties), and with him came the new Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping.

Despite the efforts of Rühle and the CDU/CSU government of Kohl to affect a quite extensive overhaul of the Bundeswehr in their 1992 and 1994 programs, Scharping and the Red/Green Schröder government inherited an incomplete reorganization of the Federal Republic's security and defense apparatus. The "incremental approach to defense normalization"¹⁵² as one writer described it, was beginning to receive some rather stark criticism from the more conservative side of Germany foreign and defense policy observers. The main complaint coming from this group was, in short, that the government's incremental approach toward participation in peace support operations had not been matched with an equally important policy of addressing the armed forces and its role in German society.¹⁵³

Immediately upon taking over the MoD, the new Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping took steps to address this criticism. Scharping quickly commissioned a blue ribbon panel of experts, led by former Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker, to analyze the Bundeswehr's challenges and needs, and to make proposals for its reform. This group of high profile and well respected military experts, businessmen, and former government officials, known as the Bundeswehr Reform Commission, released its 179 page report on 23 May 2000 with a blunt but clear conclusion: "The way the Bundeswehr looks today, it is not capable to cope with the tasks it has to fulfill."¹⁵⁴

The report from the Bundeswehr Reform Commission addressed all aspects of German defense structures, from risk assessment and threat analysis

¹⁵² Thomas-Durell Young, "Defense Planning and the Bundeswehr's New Search for Legitimacy," in *Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, (Carlisle Barracks, Penn. December 1996) p.56.

¹⁵³ Thomas-Durell Young, in the Introduction to *Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, (Carlisle Barracks, Penn. December 1996) p.3.

¹⁵⁴ *Commission for a Common Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, report of the Commission to the Federal Government, 23 May 2000.

to equipment needs and command and control changes. But of the report's 15 major recommendations, the ones that got the most attention were concerning overall troop strength and conscription. The Weizsäcker report recommended an overall strength of 240,000 troops—140,000 of those for crisis reaction—and cutting the number of conscripts from 130,000 to just 30,000. The report also recommended sticking with conscription at least for the near future, and kept the length of compulsory service at 10 months.¹⁵⁵ With these changes the commission envisioned a more balanced and more modern force suited for the new challenges of the 21st century.

At the same time the Weizsäcker commission was preparing its report, Scharping asked the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr (Generalinspekteur von Kirchbach) to work on his own reform plan in order to start up a broad public discussion about the future shape and role of the Bundeswehr. Released concurrently with the Weizsäcker report, von Kirchbach's plan contained many similarities with the Reform Commission's overall concept for creating more modern deployable forces for use mainly in a crisis reaction role. Both reports assumed the requirement to perform two crisis reaction missions at the same time, both called for improvements in the areas outlined by NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative, and both stood by conscription although von Kirchbach's plan saw compulsory service being shortened to 9 months. But in the main issue of overall troop strength, von Kirchbach called for a larger total force of 290,000 with 157,000 of those in the KRK (crisis reaction forces). He also wanted a much larger number of conscripts retained—84,000.¹⁵⁶

Since assuming office Scharping had remained tight lipped about his own preferences for Bundeswehr reform, but then only hours after the Weizsäcker report had been released he announced that he would present his own plan in a cabinet meeting scheduled for 14 June 2000. And in another unexpected move only days after von Kirchbach had released his own report; Scharping fired his

¹⁵⁵ Executive Summary, *Commission for a Common Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, report of the Commission to the Federal Government, 23 May 2000, p.3-4.

¹⁵⁶ Federal Ministry of Defense, *Cornerstone for the Concept and Planning for the Future Development of the Armed Forces*, (Bonn, 23 May 2000).

Generalinspekteur, saying publicly that von Kirchbach had asked to retire in order to allow for continuity of reform under a new Generalinspekteur (which was to be Air Force General Harald Kujat). In reality, von Kirchbach, viewed as a 'soldier's soldier' and well liked by the troops, had not seen eye to eye with the career politician Scharping for months and had actually asked to retire two weeks before the official announcement from the MoD.¹⁵⁷ According to press reports, von Kirchbach felt Scharping was using the Bundeswehr's senior leadership as a 'political toy' (or *politischen Spielball*) and was not going in the right direction with Bundeswehr reform. Von Kirchbach did not want to be associated with the direction that was about to be announced and tried to leave in protest, but Scharping did not accept his resignation until after the public release of both the Weizsäcker report and the Generalinspekteur's own Cornerstone paper.¹⁵⁸

Scharping's plan, titled *The Bundeswehr—Advancing steadily into the 21st Century—Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal*, fell basically in the middle between the Weizsäcker and the von Kirchbach proposals.¹⁵⁹ The overall strength of the armed forces was set at around 255,000, with 150,000 of those for the KRK (crisis reaction forces). The number of conscripts was set at around 80,000 with a reduction in the length of compulsory military service from 10 to 9 months beginning in 2002.¹⁶⁰ Like all ministers before him, Scharping stood by the need to retain conscription in order to ensure adequate force levels and to keep the Bundeswehr anchored in society.

¹⁵⁷ Michael J. Inacker, *Scharpings falsches Spiel Der neue Mann des Ministers*, Die Welt, 25 May 2000.

¹⁵⁸ Michael J. Inacker, *Scharping entlässt Generalinspekteur*, Die Welt, 25 May 2000.

¹⁵⁹ Christoph Neßhöver, *Preparing Germany's Armed Forces for the Future The Bundeswehr at a Crossroads*, an AICGS report, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, (Washington: 2000), p.3. www.aicgs.org/at-issue/bundeswehr.shtml

¹⁶⁰ Federal Ministry of Defense, *The Bundeswehr—Advancing steadily into the 21st Century—Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal*, (Berlin: 2000), paragraphs 54-63.

The Scharping plan also made significant changes in the structure and command relationships of the Bundeswehr.¹⁶¹ The position of the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr (Generalinspekteur) was strengthened in the areas of force planning, and mission planning and execution. Additionally, in order to optimize all common tasks within the Bundeswehr, all the command support, intelligence and support assets, and some of the training assets, three new entities were created. First, and by far the most significant creation, was the Joint Support Service (*Streitkräftebasis*). The creation of the Joint Support Service represented the most significant increase in operational command and control of the Bundeswehr since the 1995 *Führungszentrum* (central command center) was set up within the Joint Staff. The new Joint Support Service consists of the Joint Support Command (*Streitkräfteunterstützungskommando*), Joint Operations Command (*Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr*), and the Armed Forces Offices (*Streitkräfteamt*). Its personnel distribution is 70% army, 22% air force, and 8% navy; with 20,000 civilian positions and about 50,000 military positions.¹⁶² Essentially, all aspects of Bundeswehr logistics, psychological operations, and strategic intelligence were untied under the Joint Support Command, as well as command and control of the various Military District Commands or *Wehrbereichskommandos* (which were reduced from seven to four). The Joint Operations Command was given the responsibility for planning and conducting all German armed forces operations and will also serve as the national element and infrastructure for a European Union Operations Headquarters for foreign deployments. The creation of this Operations Command abolished the distinction between reaction forces and main defense forces.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ While the Scharping plan was published in June 2000 under the *Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal* document, the most extensive explanation of the details of the reform plan in English was not provided until April 2002 with the publication of *The Bundeswehr in 2002, the Current Situation and Perspectives*. For this reason, the details of the Scharping plan cited here come from the April 2002 document.

¹⁶² Vizeadmiral Bernd Heise, *Die Streitkräftebasis als Service und Force Provider für die Bundeswehr im In- und Ausland*, Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Bonn: December 2001), www.sicherheitspolitik.bundeswehr.de/

¹⁶³ Federal Ministry of Defense, *The Bundeswehr in 2002, The Current Situation and Perspectives*, (Berlin: April 2002), p.46-47.

The second new entity, the Bundeswehr Central Medical Service, was the result of a major reorganization of all medical assets within the Bundeswehr. Under the control of the Surgeon General, the Central Medical Service consists of the Medical Forces Command and the Medical Office. Under the Medical Forces Command, four sub-commands and a new Rapid Reaction Medical Force was established. This consolidated tactical treatment centers, tactical medical units, and Bundeswehr station hospitals under one command.¹⁶⁴

The third new entity created by Scharping was the new Federal Office of Information Management and Information Technology of the Bundeswehr (Bw IT Office), and did not come into existence until 2002. Given NATO's recent emphasis on new technology via the 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative, this new Bundeswehr IT Office was seen as extremely important. Under the Federal Ministry of Defense IT Director, responsibility for IT system planning, concepts, implementation and use was placed in the hands of one person. This transferred the IT responsibilities of 13 different agencies to the central Bw IT Office.¹⁶⁵

In the area of individual service restructuring Scharping made some minor adjustments, the details of which were outlined most clearly in his 2002 report, *The Bundeswehr in 2002, The Current Situation and Perspectives*. The 1994 decision to reduce the army down to seven divisions was reversed, with the number of divisions being set at eight (the same number called for in the 1992 DPG). Of the eight divisions, five would be mechanized, one special operations, one air mobile, and one combat support division called the Army Support Forces Command. The air force was reorganized into four air divisions, an Air Transport Command, and an Air Force Operations Command. The navy was left unchanged with five flotillas under the Fleet Command.¹⁶⁶

As has been stressed numerous times in this thesis, the incremental attempts at Bundeswehr reform since 1990 have been substantially affected by the intricate relationships associated with Germany's NATO alliance membership

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. p.49.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. p.42.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. p.47-48.

and with Germany's role in the European Union and its efforts to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Certainly Rudolf Scharping found his tenure as Defense Minister to be no exception to this rule. While attempting to push his own reform plan, as outlined above, through to fruition from 1999 to 2001, Scharping and the Schröder government felt the pressures coming from both the NATO and EU reactions to two events that would shape Western foreign and security policies for years to come. Those two watershed events were the 1999 Kosovo air war and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.¹⁶⁷ The resulting NATO and EU policies and programs stemming from these events had tremendous impact upon the character of German defense reform leading into the new century.

In short, the main lesson learned by the European members of NATO from the Alliance's military actions in Kosovo in 1999 was that they were entirely too dependent upon the United States' military might. In contrast to IFOR and SFOR where the European allies provided the majority of ground troops, the Kosovo air war (Operation Allied Force) was almost entirely dominated by the United States. The US flew 60% of all air sorties and dropped 80% of all precision-guided munitions in Operation Allied Force.¹⁶⁸ The overall effect of this poor showing on the part of the Europeans was summed up by Marshall Center expert Peter van Ham:

At the same time as the debate ensued concerning a new EU defense role, developments in Kosovo confronted European governments with the fact that they were militarily impotent to support regional crisis management, even in a situation that was in immediate geographic proximity.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ No doubt experts can make the case that there were other key events and developments during this time period that should also be included in this analysis. However, in the interest of brevity and in order not to stray too far from the main topic, this discussion was limited to these two events, as they had the most dramatic influence upon German defense policy and reforms.

¹⁶⁸ Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo, (Brookings Institute: 2000), p.150.

¹⁶⁹ Peter van Ham, *Europe's New Defense Ambition: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia*, Marshall Center Paper, 1999, p.7.

Both NATO and the EU reacted to the embarrassment of Allied Force before the end of the year—NATO with its new Strategic Concept and Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), and the EU with the Helsinki Headline Goals and plans for a European rapid reaction force. The main theme of NATO's Washington Summit in April of 1999, and a few months later the theme of its new Secretary-General Lord Robertson, was capabilities, capabilities, and capabilities. NATO's new Strategic Concept acknowledged that crisis response operations like those in Bosnia and Kosovo were likely to remain a key aspect of NATO's contribution to Euro-Atlantic peace and security¹⁷⁰; and in light of the deficiencies experienced during those operations NATO launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative. DCI was aimed at improving the military capabilities of its members (primarily European members) in five main categories: mobility and deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability, and interoperable communications.¹⁷¹

With Kosovo in the forefront of their minds, the European Union addressed very much the same issues as NATO at its December 1999 European Council meeting in Helsinki. Adding to their previous efforts to build up a European Security and Defense Policy (EDSP), the EU established what are known as the "Headline Goals" for its member states in terms of their military capabilities for crisis management operations. The Headline Goals called for the creation of a European force of up to 60,000 troops able to deploy within 60 days of notification and sustainable for up to one year, in order to carry out the full range of the so-called Petersberg tasks outlined in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. These tasks consist of humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking. This European rapid reaction force was to be operational no later than 2003, and would give the

¹⁷⁰ NATO Handbook, 2001 edition, NATO Office of Information and Press (Brussels: 2001), p.46.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.* p.52.

EU autonomous capacity to take decisions where NATO was not, or chose not to be, engaged.¹⁷²

The six to eight months from the announcement of both the NATO and EU initiatives to the publication of Scharping's reform plan, were filled with speculation from observers of German defense policy as to what these initiatives meant for Germany, and as to which side Germany would support the most—the European or Atlantic. Opinions ranged from claiming that German foreign and security policy would become “Europeanized,” to those worried about a new German “assertiveness.” But the more tangible concern shared by French, British, and some German writers, seemed to be that Germany lacked the fiscal resources to meet the requirements of Helsinki or Washington.¹⁷³ Scharping's middle of the road approach did not end this debate one way or the other. Instead, his reform plan fit the German pattern of trying to ride the fence between satisfying external alliance and EU concerns and ensuring that no drastic moves were made to upset their domestic audience (i.e. abolish conscription, dramatic force level cuts, or large defense budget increases). Representative of this satisfy both sides approach is this passage out of the 2000 Bundeswehr plan:

Strengthening the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance and further developing the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the European Union are complementary, intertwined processes aimed at providing the Europeans the capability to act independently in the field of political and military crisis management (Petersberg missions).¹⁷⁴

To that end, Germany promised some 32,000 soldiers, 130 aircraft and 18 ships toward the fulfillment of the Helsinki Headline Goals¹⁷⁵, and selected three of the five areas for improvement listed in NATO's DCI for its new “capability profile;”

¹⁷² NATO Handbook, 2001 edition, NATO Office of Information and Press (Brussels: 2001), p.102.

¹⁷³ These assessments can all be found in “German Foreign Policy in Dialogue,” No. 2, July 2000, *German Foreign Policy Newsletter* Issue 02, www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue02.html

¹⁷⁴ Federal Ministry of Defense, *The Bundeswehr—Advancing steadily into the 21st Century—Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal*, (Berlin: 2000), paragraph 10.

¹⁷⁵ Federal Ministry of Defense, *The Bundeswehr in 2002, The Current Situation and Perspectives*, (Berlin: April 2002), p.17.

namely strategic deployability, global intelligence, and command, control, & communication capability.¹⁷⁶ The bottom line message of these two programs taken together for the Bundeswehr was that it must be capable of participating in two medium-scale operations simultaneously, a realization that was confirmed in Scharping's 2000 plan.

But to be fair to Scharping and the German government, their reform plans, middle of the road or not, were headed in the right direction and reflected the maturation of the forces and influences that had been mounting from NATO, the EU and from German domestic politics for several very unpredictable and violent years. Very real and tangible improvements were made in the key areas addressed by both NATO's DCI and the EU's Petersberg tasks. It improved the area of command and control of deployed forces by creating the BwOPSCOM. It improved efficiency and deployability by abolishing the distinction between crisis reaction forces and territorial defense forces and by concentrating on lighter weapons platforms; and it improved financial management by making smarter procurement decisions and by going to what Scharping called "Innovation, Investment and Economic Efficiency in the Bundeswehr."¹⁷⁷ But perhaps Scharping's most notable victory was the deal he struck with Eichel's Ministry of Finance whereby 80% of the proceeds from the sale of property from closed down Bundeswehr installations will be allocated back to the defense budget as additional revenue.¹⁷⁸ This agreement, plus Eichel's promise to stabilize the overall German defense budget at 24.4 billion Euros through 2006, seemed to stop the financial blood letting that began in the early 1990s, and helped to shore up allied confidence in Germany's ability to meet its alliance obligations.

Just when it seemed the Ministry of Defense was beginning to make real progress with reform plans and budget issues, the second watershed event influencing not only German, but most major powers' foreign and security policies

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. p.34.

¹⁷⁷ Federal Ministry of Defense, *The Bundeswehr—Advancing steadily into the 21st Century—Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal*, (Berlin: 2000), paragraph 52.

¹⁷⁸ Federal Ministry of Defense, *The Bundeswehr in 2002, The Current Situation and Perspectives*, (Berlin: April 2002), p.44.

occurred. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon not only killed almost 3,000 innocent people, but it more importantly threw the United States, and to a much lesser degree Europe, into a global war on terrorism. To adequately discuss and analyze in detail the effects of the 11 September attacks and ensuing US-led actions on European foreign and security policy (especially the US-German relationship) would require far more space than this thesis is at liberty to give. Therefore, suffice it to say that net effect of the policies and actions surrounding the 11 September attacks on German defense policy was an increase in demand for German military and security resources.

In the near term, NATO's declaration of Article 5 (the mutual defense clause) on 12 September 2001 set the stage for Germany's participation in operations Active Endeavor (naval forces in the Mediterranean), Eagle Assist (NATO AWACS duty in the USA), and Enduring Freedom (coalition actions in Afghanistan). All together this consumed approximately 2,000 Bundeswehr troops¹⁷⁹ in various capacities, not counting the police and security forces that were devoted to securing American military bases in Germany in order to free up US soldiers for duties in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In the long term, Germany's commitment to help fight the international war on terrorism led it to participate in, and later take command of, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan—to the surprise of some observers, even before NATO agreed to be intimately involved.¹⁸⁰ At present, Germany still has troops and assets committed to a majority of these operations.

A great deal had transpired in the world and within the *Bendlerblock* (home of the German Ministry of Defense) by the time Scharping published his

¹⁷⁹ Federal Ministry of Defense, *The Bundeswehr in 2002, The Current Situation and Perspectives*, (Berlin: April 2002), p.10-11.

¹⁸⁰ UNSC Resolution 1386 authorized ISAF in December 2001. Germany contributed approximately 1,200 troops at that time, and then assumed command of ISAF in March 2002. NATO, while providing technical and planning assistance since its inception, did not officially take over control of ISAF until August 2003. See Federal Ministry of Defense, *The Bundeswehr in 2002, The Current Situation and Perspectives*, (Berlin: April 2002). NATO Update, 16 April 2003, www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/04-april/e0416a.htm

2002 Situation and Perspectives document in April. In the realm of strategic culture, Germany seemed to be defying, at least to a certain extent, the long held policy of reticence or restraint (*Zurückhaltung*) in favor of a new definition of what it meant to be a reliable ally (*Bündnisfähigkeit*). At the time Scharping took over as Defense Minister, the Bundeswehr had about 2,800 soldiers deployed on peacekeeping missions (mainly in Bosnia), but by April 2002 it had some 10,000 troops serving in a multitude of operations from Kosovo to the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan.¹⁸¹ Since the days of the *Armee der Einheit*, three different defense ministers had steered the Bundeswehr through unification and the demands to see a ‘peace dividend;’ almost constant budget cuts; the 1991 Gulf War; near war in the Balkans; the demands of an emerging EU military capacity and defense policy; the sensitivities of an unsure post-Cold War NATO alliance; and was now contending with the new terrorism of a post-9/11 world. Through it all German leaders had struggled to maintain a sense of calculability in their actions (*Berechenbarkeit*) in the face of such incalculable times—and it was not over yet.

In his personal note in the preface to the 2002 document, Scharping had to admit:

Our soldiers are well-trained and well-equipped. Even so, every operation has brought it home to us that the Bundeswehr does not yet have the capabilities needed to be employed in the broadened task spectrum. The urgency of the need for reform can hardly be more evident. What is more, we must face the fact that developments in international affairs will not ease the situation in the foreseeable future. This is why we are working flat out to implement the reform of the Bundeswehr.¹⁸²

In many ways these words represent what the MoD had been facing since 1991 and is still facing today. But Scharping, in his 2002 document, tried to take the major plans and programs of his June 2000 Cornerstone plan and update them to address the new challenges of post-9/11 terrorism, new influences from NATO and the EU, as well as the ever problematic financial situation. All of the

¹⁸¹ Federal Ministry of Defense, *The Bundeswehr in 2002, The Current Situation and Perspectives*, (Berlin: April 2002), p.3.

¹⁸² Federal Ministry of Defense, *The Bundeswehr in 2002, The Current Situation and Perspectives*, (Berlin: April 2002), p.3.

major restructuring plans announced in the 2000 plan were reiterated in the 2002 *Situation and Perspectives* document, and the primary missions of the Bundeswehr remained the same. Protecting Germany and its citizens against external dangers, and defending Germany and its allies were the two main missions, and the associated sub-tasks needed to accomplish these missions read very much like the European Union's Petersberg tasks.¹⁸³

The 2002 document emphasized that through the Bundeswehr's participation in international operations around the world, especially since 9/11, Germany was shouldering its international responsibility in a manner commensurate with its weight in Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, and was honoring its expression of solidarity with the United States. It also spoke in detail of the advantages of its modern business management program designed to increase efficiency, cut costs, and streamline the procurement process, all of which were to allow the Bundeswehr to operate within constrained budget parameters, yet still realize its modernization and procurement goals through 2006. Key to this effort was the budget arrangement with the Finance Ministry mentioned earlier (80% of the proceeds from the sale of MoD property goes back to Bundeswehr coffers), and the new Development, Procurement and Management Group (GEBB) first mentioned in the 2000 plan.

Unfortunately, Rudolf Scharping did not remain in office long enough to see his reform efforts come to fruition. Only three months after the publication of the 2002 document, Scharping was forced to resign over a misappropriation/misuse of Bundeswehr assets scandal in July 2002. This set the stage for the arrival of the current Minister of Defense, Dr. Peter Struck, that same month. After taking the rest of 2002 to settle in to his new position and take stock of the situation, Struck announced his own ideas on Bundeswehr reform in May of 2003 through the publication of the first Defense Policy Guidelines (*Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*, or VPR) since 1992. Struck's 2003 guidelines were based upon the work the Weizsäcker commission and

¹⁸³ Ibid. p.24-26.

corresponded with the broad understanding of defense that had evolved over the past few years, but Struck's plan also called into question the middle of the road approach taken by Scharping. Struck knew that Scharping's reductions in troop levels and number of bases were not enough, and more cuts would have to be made in order to realize the savings necessary to truly carry out comprehensive Bundeswehr reform.

In many aspects, the 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines contained the same overarching ideas about security and defense policy as previous reform efforts. The three main areas were listed as the "transatlantic partnership," the "European area of stability," and participation "in UN and OSCE efforts."¹⁸⁴ It contained familiar references to the importance of allied and multilateral relationships such as: "the Bundeswehr will conduct armed operations only together with allies and partners in a UN, NATO and EU context," and "Germany's NATO membership is the cornerstone of its security."¹⁸⁵ It also reflected the underlying tension that had been developing during the Scharping years between the need to remain firmly connected to the US and the need to clearly support EU defense efforts. Germany, always in the middle, placated both sides by shrewdly saying, "The United States of America remain indispensable to European security" in one section, and then saying, "The EU is the nucleus of the European area of stability" in another.¹⁸⁶

But underneath this familiar strategic culture rhetoric laid some rather new realizations which attest to the growing determination of German defense leaders to break out of their culture of reticence and act more inline with Germany's weight in the international community. The first of these realizations was clearly stated in section titled *The Bundeswehr on Operations* by saying, "The Bundeswehr is more frequently assuming a leading role in multinational operations," and that the necessity to participate in these operations may arise

¹⁸⁴ Federal Ministry of Defense, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, (Berlin: 21 May 2003), p.9, Para. 40.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. p.10, Para. 42, 46.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. p.8, Para.32; p.11, Para.50.

“anywhere in the world,” may be at short notice and “may extend across the entire mission spectrum down to high-intensity operations...even beyond the boundaries of Allied territory.”¹⁸⁷ The pragmatic rationale behind assuming a leading role in multinational operations was two fold. First, the security environment was characterized by “changed risks and new opportunities.” “At present, and in the foreseeable future, there is no conventional threat to the German territory.”¹⁸⁸ In short, since there is no threat to Germany itself, it can afford to concentrate on the prevention and containment of more distant and regional crises and conflicts abroad. Second, Germany’s obligation to be a reliable ally and partner demands that it take a leading role when needed. Since Bundeswehr operations in places like Somalia, East Timor and the Balkans, even the German people were beginning to see this side of the logic, at least in terms of humanitarian intervention in order to stop human suffering.

The second new realization of the 2003 guidelines was a natural extension of the first. If the Bundeswehr was going to take on a more leading role in the world, then the way to do it—given Germany’s historical baggage, strategic culture, and material limitations—was through the socially and politically acceptable missions of “conflict prevention and crisis management.” Under the heading *Key statements* it said: “The security situation calls for a security and defence policy that is geared to the prevention and containment of crises and conflicts...”¹⁸⁹ In fact, “conflict prevention and crisis management” became the central operational theme of the entire 2003 DPG, with this phrase appearing 19 times in only a 20 page document. International conflict prevention and crisis management became the number one task of the Bundeswehr, followed by support of allies and protection of Germany and its citizens. The consequences of the Bundeswehr making conflict prevention and crisis management its main focus were outlined in section VIII. *Consequences for the Bundeswehr*. The main impact was that “suitable and sufficient forces must be kept available at

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. p.12, Para. 56-59.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. p.4, Para. 9.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid. p.4, Para. 10.

high readiness and with a rapid response capability.”¹⁹⁰ It also meant that these forces had to be highly professional and flexible with a high degree of interoperability.¹⁹¹ This obviously put a premium on the Bundeswehr’s transformation efforts. In the words of the MoD, the tasks of conflict prevention and crisis management “do in fact determine the structure of the Bundeswehr.”¹⁹²

Struck envisioned meeting these goals through a bold combination of role specialization and “jointness-oriented” way of thinking. Realizing the fiscal restraints under which he was operating, Struck saw cooperating with allies and partners in terms of harmonizing capabilities as a way to avoid duplication of capacities, and as a way of targeting Germany’s scarce financial resources in one direction. It would be possible to dispense with certain individual capabilities if these could be provided or taken over by other nations’ forces. This is in line with the NATO idea of niche contributions formalized at the 2002 Prague summit, where Germany was asked to take the lead in the area of air transport. The MoD decided to order 60 new Airbus A400M aircraft which are slated to be delivered in 2010.¹⁹³ Additionally, any facility or service that did not directly contribute to the attainment of core goals (conflict prevention and crisis management) would be subject to “critical examination.” The corollary to role specialization was jointness within the Bundeswehr. To Struck, increased demands necessitated an unrestricted application of jointness in thinking and acting, and he made it clear that the Bundeswehr’s overall capability would take priority over the capabilities of the individual services. Although the full ramifications of this way of thinking were not felt until 2004, one example of things to come was the decision to disband the navy’s TORNADO air wing and turn its aircraft over to the air force,

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. p.18, Para. 84.

¹⁹¹ Ibid. p.19, Para. 89.

¹⁹² Ibid. p.16. Para. 78.

¹⁹³ Stephen Szabo and Mary Hampton, *Reinventing the German Military*, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Policy Report 11, (Washington: 2003), p. 18. www.aicgs.org

which will assume sea strike responsibilities by the end of 2005.¹⁹⁴ This along with other moves toward jointness was not far off.

There is no doubt Struck's 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines would have been seen as both utopian and unacceptable ten years ago. The idea that a German defense minister would assert that German defense begins at the Hindu Kush, as Struck did in 2003, was unthinkable before 2001. But at the end of 2003 German troops were serving in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf area. Despite Germany's disagreement with the US over the war in Iraq and its realist attitude toward foreign policy, Struck's ideas were compatible with the shift occurring in US, NATO, and EU doctrine toward a definition of new threats associated with international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed states.¹⁹⁵ Struck has even proven he can hold his own in the face of allegations about an "old" versus "new Europe" which were spawned by the comments of US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

But despite these laudable improvements, at least two main questions remained going into 2004 regarding Bundeswehr reform and transformation. First is the question of conscription. The German government's position has always been that conscription (the *Wehrpflicht*) was an essential element in the Bundeswehr's ability to maintain adequate force levels, was a main source of longer term volunteers and career soldiers, and more importantly, was necessary to keep the military firmly rooted in and aware of its place in a democratic society. The decision to retain conscription or to move to an all-volunteer professional force is a very contentious issue in Germany today, and will be discussed in detail in following chapters, but what should be mentioned here is that despite growing pressure to abolish conscription (including pressure from the NATO Secretary General), Struck firmly stood by the continued necessity of compulsory

¹⁹⁴ press conference on the continued reform of the armed forces, 21 February 2003, given by Minister of Defense Peter Struck, Federal Ministry of Defense, (Berlin:2003). www.bmvg.de/archiv/reden/minister/print/030221_planungsweisungen_gi.php

¹⁹⁵ Stephen Szabo and Mary Hampton, *Reinventing the German Military*, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Policy Report 11, (Washington: 2003), p. 9. www.aicgs.org

military service. However, since overall personnel levels over the last several years have not required the services of all individuals eligible in a particular year group, the total number of recruits was reduced by 15,000, down to a new level of 50,000.

The second big question, which has plagued Germany since unification, is money. Given that Germany's defense spending is fixed at 24.4 billion euros until 2006, how can the MoD find the means to modernize its forces without new money? As outlined above, Struck is emphasizing collaboration and pooling of resources with other European partners as well as the need for role specialization and jointness of thinking at home. He also hopes to free up enough funds to increase research and development by about 100 million euros, and raise procurement funds by about .5 billion euros. Some of this money will come from the savings of another round of base closures (100 of the 530 remaining bases will be closed), and further personnel reductions (32,000 uniformed and 70,000 civilian positions will be cut).¹⁹⁶

The most recent round of Bundeswehr reforms, announced at a joint press conference by Defense Minister Struck and his military chief General Wolfgang Schneiderhan on 13 January 2004, have certainly not disappointed observers of German military transformation who have become accustomed to seeing increasingly more bold and revolutionary changes in the armed forces. The 2004 reform plan, called *Konzeption und Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr* (Concept and Further Development of the German Armed Forces), is the maturation of Struck's concept of jointness within the Bundeswehr and is an answer to the question of how Germany intends to modernize and streamline its forces to handle conflict prevention and crisis management without additional funding. In their truly joint vision, the Struck-Schneiderhan concept divides the German armed forces into three types of forces: *Eingreifkräfte* (crisis reaction forces), *Stabilisierungskräfte* (stabilization forces), and *Unterstützungskräfte* (support

¹⁹⁶ Stephen Szabo and Mary Hampton, *Reinventing the German Military*, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Policy Report 11, (Washington: 2003), p. 11. www.aicgs.org

forces).¹⁹⁷ While the individual services still retain their own identity, all of their assets and personnel will be rolled into the three new categories of forces.

The Bundeswehr's *crisis reaction forces* will be maintained at the highest state of readiness, trained and equipped to execute worldwide multinational high intensity operations in all dimensions (land, air, and sea). The crisis reaction forces will consist of about 35,000 soldiers from all branches service and be organized at division level. They will have the most modern equipment possible to include the ability to conduct network centric operations. Germany's contribution to the NATO Response Force and the EU's rapid crisis reaction forces will come out of this category.¹⁹⁸

Stabilization forces are intended to handle middle to low intensity operations of a longer duration, to include long term peace keeping and separation of combating forces, embargo enforcement, and assistance with civil reconstruction operations. A total of about 70,000 soldiers from all services will be sub-divided into brigade level units consisting of about 14,000 soldiers each, giving Germany the capacity to execute up to five separate mid to low intensity operations simultaneously.¹⁹⁹

The *support forces* will encompass the remaining 137,500 soldiers and about 75,000 civilians of the armed forces, including about 40,000 personnel in training status. The main mission of this category will be the long term sustainment and support of deployments across the full range of the operational spectrum. To get down to these numbers, an overall reduction of about 35,000 soldiers and 10,000 civilians will be necessary.²⁰⁰

Obviously in order to achieve the level of jointness envisioned in this plan, certain changes are necessary within the individual services. For the army, this

¹⁹⁷ Federal Ministry of Defense, Transcript of joint press conference by Minister of Defense Peter Struck and Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr General Wolfgang Schneiderhan on the *Concept and Further Development of the Bundeswehr*, (Berlin: 13 January 2004).

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. p.6-7.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. p.7-8.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. p.9-10.

means the total number of divisions will go from eight to five, with one of the five being designated to command and control the army portion of the crisis reaction forces. For the air force, the number of Luftwaffe divisions will be reduced from four to three, with the anticipation of the air transport command going away once the European Union's air transport command is established. For the navy, the previous six types of flotillas will be reduced to only two types. Also still to be resolved is the participation of conscript soldiers in these three categories of forces. Article 35 of the German constitution (Basic Law) prohibits requiring draftees to serve in deployments outside German territory, although volunteers with the proper training are allowed to participate. As Generalinspekteur Schneiderhan observed, this is an open question which must be answered through more detailed planning over the next few months.²⁰¹

The 2004 concept also clarified the road ahead for modernization and procurement. Of key importance is Germany's ability to operate on par with the United States in what is called network centric warfare. To that end, Struck announced that this year he will ask the German parliament to approve the first phase of the armed forces common information management system. He also confirmed the continued procurement of the strategic reconnaissance system SAR LUPE, the acquisition of the MPA 3C Orion aircraft for the navy, and the acquisition of the DINGO and GTK light armored vehicles for the army. The Bundeswehr will continue to pursue the purchases of the TIGER, MH 90 and NH 90 helicopters, and the Eurofighter combat aircraft. However, programs that will no longer be pursued are the navy's UAV development, the MARS air defense system, and the purchase of the improved Patriot missile.²⁰²

Although controversial to some in Germany, including the former Army Chief of Staff General Gudera who asked for early retirement only days after Struck announced his 2004 concept, Germany's latest transformation efforts are seen by many experts as compatible with the new challenges it will face in the post 9/11 world. Struck's road map, if successful, will give the Bundeswehr the

²⁰¹ Ibid. p.4-6.

²⁰² Ibid. p.11-12.

ability to deal with the challenges of global asymmetric warfare while incorporating innovations in technology and lessons learned from the revolution in military affairs. While critics argue that the 2004 concept still has not properly dealt with the tough issues of conscription and lack of financing, many supporters feel Struck and company have gone farther than previous administrations in instituting the necessary reforms and reductions to keep the Bundeswehr a leading force in multinational and international operations.

E. SUMMARY

As this chapter has explored in detail, over the last 14 years the German armed forces have undergone almost constant change in an effort to deal with the various internal and external forces influencing German defense and security policy. Undoubtedly, the various aspects of a firmly established German political and strategic culture have played an instrumental role in the outcome of these reform efforts. The long held belief among Germans that the use of force should only be applied to the defense of German territory and even then done so through the allied structure of NATO, has had a strong restraining effect upon the Bundeswehr and its willingness to operate “out of area.” Likewise, the strict interpretation of the German Basic Law concerning the use of military forces has influenced the role of the Bundeswehr since days of Helmut Kohl, and still plays an important role today.

But as the post-Cold War security environment began to unfold throughout the 1990s, equally strong strategic cultural beliefs started to influence German security policy and the Bundeswehr. Chief among them was the strong desire for Germany to prove its trustworthiness and reliability as an ally and partner among the Western community of nations. As Germany increasingly came under pressure to contribute resources and forces to the multitude of peacekeeping and contingency missions encountered in the mid to late 1990s, this desire to be *Bündnisfähig*, a reliable ally, began to eclipse the countervailing desire to stay out of the spotlight and keep German troops at home. Coupled with the fact that Germans give primacy of place to multinational and international institutions,

German politicians found it exceedingly more difficult to ignore the calls for participation from the UN and NATO in areas such as the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and later Afghanistan.

With this new interpretation of Germany's international security responsibilities, came a need to reinterpret the role and missions of the Bundeswehr. Its Cold War force structures and Warsaw Pact era doctrine was outdated and ill suited for the new post-Cold War security environment. As this chapter has outlined, the Bundeswehr and Ministry of Defense has struggled to come to grips with these new challenges, and has taken a step-wise and incremental approach over the years toward gradually bringing the German armed forces into the 21st Century and more in line with its allies and partners. Although being pressured from internal forces (political parties and public opinion) to go one way and from external pressures (NATO, EU, and US) to go another, MoD and Bundeswehr leaders have used what has been called "salami tactics" to make incremental reforms which always had to stay within the acceptable middle ground between the two opposite forces. As one German foreign policy expert observed, such "salami tactics" served to broaden the permissible scope of action for the more difficult issues such as out of area deployments, and the abolition of conscription.²⁰³ As of early 2004, it seems as if these tactics have at least allowed Germany to solve the out of area problem. Today some 10,000 German soldiers are serving in various deployments around the world, and Defense Minister Struck's idea of German defense beginning at the Hindu Kush no longer invites the strong reaction it once did.

That is not to say there are not still major challenges that lie ahead for the Bundeswehr and for German defense policy. Germany, along with other European nations, are still under pressure from NATO and the US to increase their defense spending, and the German economy is still reeling from the effects of the world economic slump experienced after 9/11. With Germany's defense

²⁰³ Marco Overhaus, German *Defense Policy and the Dangerous Culture of Disinterest*, Deutsche-Aussenpolitik, Opinion Editorial No. 6., August 2003, www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/digest/op-ed_inhalt_06.php

budget fixed until 2006, this problem is not likely to be resolved any time soon. Then there is the issue of conscription. The government is coming under increasing pressure from liberal political parties, as well as NATO, who believe Germany should move to an all volunteer and professional force, albeit for different reasons. This issue, along with other major challenges to German military transformation will be the subject of the next chapter.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Previous chapters of this essay have discussed in detail the history and nature of German national security culture; the implications this culture and its internal-external linkages have had upon post-Cold War foreign policy; as well as examining the influence of these factors upon reform and transformation efforts of the German armed forces—the Bundeswehr. But what should be said of the contemporary political and operating environment of German defense reform today? How are those in the driver's seat of policy making today dealing with the challenges that face them, and more importantly, how are those most effected by these policies (the soldiers and civilians of the Bundeswehr) dealing with the outcome? This concluding chapter seeks to answer these questions and to put the major issues discussed thus far into their current context by examining how the current political parties, government officials, and soldiers of the Bundeswehr see and understand the issues of German security and defense policy and Bundeswehr transformation.

This chapter will attempt to conclude the discussion of strategic culture and defense reform by taking a snapshot of current political and administration views on the sensitive issue of national security policy, and also by taking a brief glimpse at an often overlooked but important perspective—the one of the German soldiers themselves. How do the men and women of the Bundeswehr picture the recent efforts at military modernization, reform, and transformation?

A. THE POLITICAL LEVEL

Beginning at the political level, there are indeed both converging and diverging views concerning the future of German security and defense policy and Bundeswehr transformation. As in any modern democratic society, the various political parties in Germany have developed their distinct positions on the most pressing issues confronting security and defense policy today over time, and through a mixture of party politics, pragmatic analysis, and real world experience.

While there are certainly many unresolved issues surrounding Germany's current security and defense reform efforts, the views and positions of the major political parties can best be accomplished by looking at four main issues facing them today. These issues are:²⁰⁴

- Germany's fundamental strategic and security goals (what is Germany fighting for?)
- The use of the German armed forces inside German territory (what is the Bundeswehr's domestic role?)
- Conscription, the argument for and against mandatory military service (the Wehrpflicht)
- The overall progress and direction of Bundeswehr transformation (is it working?)

Interestingly, the first of these four issues will most likely not appear in the headlines of any newspaper and is not openly questioned by the German public, but it is an issue that one can find being discussed among the political and security insiders of at least the main opposition party (the CDU/CSU). The question, "Wofür kämpfen wir" (what are we fighting for) has been posed by the conservative opposition and refers to their allegation that the Schröder government has in effect put the cart before the horse in the area of security strategy.²⁰⁵

According to this train of thought, by launching a series of fundamental defense reforms beginning in 1992 with Rudolf Scharping, and continuing today with Peter Struck, the Red/Green government began defense restructuring and

²⁰⁴ It should be noted that these four issues were the main themes of discussion during the author's personal interviews with several members of the German Parliament (Bundestag), security experts from the various political parties, and officials within the German Ministry of Defense: Erich Vad, CDU/CSU security advisor; Helmut Rauber (CDU), Bundestag representative; Hans-Peter Bartels (SPD), Bundestag representative; Friedel Eggelmeyer, FDP security advisor; Winfried Nachtwei (Green Party), Bundestag representative; Jürgen Schnappertz, Planning Staff, German Ministry of Defense; LTC Peter Frank, German General Staff Officer (Fü S III 3); LTC Alexander Burmeister and Mr. Czeniek, Security and Defense Advisors to the German Parliament (Bundestag).

²⁰⁵ This question and line of reasoning was presented to the author during a personal interview with a security and defense policy advisor to the CDU/CSU party; 3 May 2004.

technical transformation before they even dealt with the basic question of overall national security strategy. In short, this has led to the adoption of an intervention army mindset, which was realized throughout the 1990s in numerous humanitarian and peacekeeping interventions, before the main political leaders had a chance to discuss and debate the fundamental direction of German national security policy. The CDU/CSU is calling for a new debate over the main direction and goals of German security strategy. They see the current Bundeswehr being overly deployed on humanitarian and peacekeeping missions abroad when there are serious security needs not being met at home. Chief among these unmet needs at home is the protection of Germany and its citizens from the dangers of international terrorism. The CDU/CSU feels not enough attention is being placed in this area, and is calling for renewed public debate on the dangers posed by terrorist threats and the appropriate preventative measures that should be taken against these dangers.²⁰⁶

The senior partner in the ruling Red/Green coalition, the SPD, feels the question of basic security strategy and direction has been answered through the various defense white papers and other official documents published since 1992, with the latest white paper due out sometime in 2005. They hold that the drastically changed security situation after the end of the Cold War called for precisely the types of forces created by the government and which were discussed in detail in the previous chapter. The SPD feels they are in no way ignoring the dangers of international terrorism and that the current efforts of Bundeswehr transformation will contribute to greater homeland security. As has been previously mentioned, the SPD believes in the widest possible definition of security, meaning not only purely military forces, but including proactive diplomatic initiatives, working with international and regional organizations, and foreign aid to developing countries in an effort to deal with the root causes of terrorism as well as being prepared for their consequences.

²⁰⁶ Taken from a resolution introduced by the CDU/CSU Fraktion in the German Bundestag, 15 Wahlperiode, "Für eine moderne Bundeswehr als Pfeiler einer verlässlichen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik Deutschlands," 26 January 2004.

Through their real world experience as the junior partner in the ruling coalition, and by inheriting the key cabinet position of Foreign Minister, the Green/Bündnis 90 Party, has developed what some might consider a surprisingly pragmatic position on the question of national security strategy. As was noted by one leading Green Party member, Germany can not hide behind multilateralism. He agrees that the question of “what are we fighting for” should be asked and debated, but sees the Green party answers much different from those of the CDU/CSU.²⁰⁷ The Green party sees overall security strategy very much like the SPD, in that the international security environment calls for an intervention army of sorts, and that Germany needs the types of forces being created through the latest transformation efforts. However, they feel that Germany should not allow the principle of multilateralism to become an excuse to delay making the tough decisions necessary to stay true to its own foreign and security policy goals. Unlike the CDU/CSU, the Green Party does not include among the goals, an increased role for the Bundeswehr in homeland security. Instead, this is mainly in reference to the continued adherence by the government on mandatory military service (the Wehrpflicht), which the Green Party has wanted to abolish for several years.

On the issue of national security strategy, the liberal Free Democrat Party (FDP) is not too far from the main SPD/Green coalition view point in that it agrees with the wider definition of security, and places a premium upon working with international organizations, the UN, the EU, and NATO. However, the FDP joins the Green Party in calling for the abolishment of conscription and feels a much smaller, although highly capable and highly trained and equipped, professional Bundeswehr should be created. In terms of facing the threat of international terrorism, the FDP feels too much attention has been placed on Afghanistan and not enough attention has been focused on the Middle-East and the Arab-Israeli conflict.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁷ Impressions gained from a personal interview with Green Party representative in the German Bundestag and member of the Defense Committee, Winfred Nachtwei, 7 May 2004.

²⁰⁸ FDP Bundestagsfraktion, *Reform der Reform—Für eine bedarfsgerechte und bündnisfähige Bundeswehr*, 21 Februar 2003.

While the debate over the overall direction of national security strategy has predominantly taken place among the political elites and out of the public eye; discussion over the use of the Bundeswehr inside German territory can be found in most newspaper headlines and is being made into a very public issue by most of the major political parties. Given the history of Germany's experience with the role of the armed forces inside its own society, one can understand why this issue is such a hot button topic, despite the fact that after 9/11 Germany was forced to take a hard look at its own domestic security and anti-terrorism arrangements. In fact, it is mainly due to the bleak memories of the National Socialists time (Nazi era) that all but one political party sees a very limited role for the Bundeswehr inside Germany.

The CDU/CSU feels the dangers presented by non-state actors and international terrorist organizations calls for a greatly expanded role of the Bundeswehr in domestic security operations. They would even like to see an amendment to the Basic Law made in order to clarify and increase the involvement of the Bundeswehr in domestic anti-terrorists operations, including strengthening air, sea, and land security. Additionally, the CDU/CSU feels the Bundeswehr has a lot to offer in the realm of emergency medical preparedness, nuclear biological and chemical defense, and intelligence support to domestic authorities. One of their main arguments in favor of this increased role of the Bundeswehr in domestic security is the fact that Bundeswehr soldiers on deployments to places like Afghanistan and Kosovo are successfully executing the same type of security tasks that which are forbidden inside Germany. They see no reason why German soldiers should not be allowed to carry out the same tasks inside their own country that they are being asked to do in another.

In what amounts to almost a united front against the CDU/CSU and its line of reasoning, are the other political parties (SPD, FDP, and Greens). They do not feel the current security situation calls for such an increased role for the Bundeswehr in domestic operations, and are adamantly opposed to the specter of German troops patrolling the streets of Berlin or other German cities. They hold that there is no question as to the legality of the domestic use of

Bundeswehr soldiers and assets in time of emergency or in the wake of a major catastrophic event; and therefore, see no need for a constitutional amendment. But they are quite clearly opposed to any blurring of the lines between civil law enforcement and purely military roles. On the specific scenario of civilian airliners being hijacked and used as weapons of mass destruction, the government and ruling coalition have agreed that the chain of command to be used in such a case needs to be clarified and clearly understood, but they stop short of requiring any amendment to the Basic Law.

The third major issue receiving increased attention of late has been a topic of heated debate inside Germany for the last several years, and carries with it many cultural and societal emotions. The issue is conscription and compulsory military service—the Wehrpflicht. The list of arguments both for and against the Wehrpflicht in Germany spans the field from discussions of money, to questions of military efficiency, and ultimately to the much talked about principle of the citizen soldier, or “*Staatsbürgers in Uniform*.” Over the last several years each political party has commissioned studies and published their own position papers outlining why Germany should either keep or abolish compulsory military service. Until April 2004, these arguments were purely political or financial in nature given that the German courts had always upheld the legality of the Wehrpflicht. But then came the first major legal ruling against the way in which the Wehrpflicht is currently being carried out by the government. In April 2004, the administrative court in Cologne issued a ruling saying that the current practice of issuing wide spread exemptions from military service and calling up only around 51% of those eligible for service, violated the constitution and was discriminatory and illegal in its current form.²⁰⁹ While this ruling only applied to the Cologne court’s jurisdictional area, it has dealt a major blow to those who still advocate the Wehrpflicht as militarily necessary and culturally desirable.

By far the party most vehemently in favor of conscription is the CDU/CSU. The conservatives cite among their reasons for the continuation of the

²⁰⁹ “Wehrpflicht hat ausgedient,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 22 April 2004, p. 5.

Wehrpflicht: a) it serves as the only sure way of keeping the military grounded in society and therefore, avoiding the danger of the military once again becoming a 'state within the state,' b) it ensures the Bundeswehr receives recruits from all walks of life and all professions and not simply from those with no other occupational choice or no skills, c) conscripts serve as the main source of mid-career and longer serving volunteers which constitute the mainstay of the NCO ranks and of the main deployment forces. As for the latest court ruling that the Wehrpflicht is unfair and unconstitutional, the CDU/CSU sees the solution to this problem in homeland security. By giving the Bundeswehr an increased role in homeland security the requirement for new recruits would increase, thereby forcing the government to reduce the number of allowable exemptions and bring in a higher percentage of eligible year groups. At least from a mathematical point of view, this would solve the problem raised by the Cologne court of unfair conscription practices. In short, their argument is to enlist more eligible citizens in the Bundeswehr and then train those not needed for out of country deployments in homeland security specialties.

The SPD is the only other political party still holding on to the position that the Wehrpflicht is a necessary and essential part of German security and defense policy. But faced with shrinking defense budgets and the need to greatly reduce overall troop levels, the SPD had to continuously reduce the number of conscripts in a particular year group actually called into military service to the point that it has become unfair and inconsistent with the original constitutional intent of the Wehrpflicht. This has left the SPD (as the senior party in the ruling coalition) in a difficult predicament. On the one hand, they rely upon the Wehrpflicht to fill not only the armed forces, but also the much needed *Zivildienst* positions in hospitals and rest homes where those who refuse military service serve out their time of required service to the government. Loosing this pool of personnel could have far reaching effects for both the Bundeswehr and the civilian social services. On the other hand, the government currently does not have the money or the political will to widen the Wehrpflicht eligibility criteria in order to comply with Basic Law intent. This situation combined with increasing

pressure from NATO member nations to move to an all-volunteer professional force has led the SPD to acknowledge that the life span of the Wehrpflicht is about to run out. Interestingly, this somewhat of a 'damned if you do, damned if you don't' predicament has led some conservatives to charge that Minister of Defense Struck is simply allowing the judicial system (via rulings like those of the Cologne court) to make the politically unpopular choice of abolishing the Wehrpflicht for him.

While the SPD could be said to be somewhat undecided as to the future of the Wehrpflicht, its junior partner the Green Party and the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) could not be surer of their position. These two parties are strongly opposed to the practice of conscription in today's society and feel the time has come for Germany to move to a small, modern, all-volunteer professional force. The main argument used by those in favor of moving away from conscription, in addition to the point that it was judged illegal by the Cologne court, is that the post-Cold War security environment no longer requires a large territorial defense force, which was only sustainable back then via conscription. Opponents to the Wehrpflicht hold that conscription can no longer be justified by purely military necessity. Instead, both the FDP and the Greens point to the various other European countries that have given up conscription in favor of smaller professional forces with overall successful results. They feel the increased costs associated with transitioning to an all-volunteer force (including better pay, training, and recruitment incentives), would be offset over the long term through reduced personnel costs and internal streamlining.

Regardless of which position is taken on the validity of the Wehrpflicht, one key factor that has contributed to the continuing argument is the lack of definitive evidence currently available to either prove or disprove one side or the other. Surprisingly, there seems to be very little well documented research or analysis as to the pros and cons of transitioning from conscription to a professional service. This allows for both sides to engage in the debate with little or no evidence to bolster their claims. That being said, at least two relatively recent German studies of this issue have been published, and their well-

researched and documented findings constructively contribute to the discussion here.

The first study was conducted by the well respected German security think-tank, *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit*, in June 2003 and was written by Hans-Dieter Lemke.²¹⁰ Lemke and his colleagues conducted an extensively detailed analysis and comparison of which type of force (conscript or volunteer) could best carry out the missions and tasks laid out by the 2003 Defense Planning Guidance (*Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*). This included staying within the overall force structure outlined in the 2003 DPG and they did not include basic trainee conscripts in the number of deployment forces required, since current German law does not require conscripts to serve overseas. The sub-title of the study makes their conclusion clear, “The volunteer army is the better solution.” The SWP study recommends a volunteer force of 100,000 troops capable of conducting overseas deployments, 20,000 of which would be available for long term missions.²¹¹ According to the study this size volunteer force, when properly structured, would allow more time for adequate basic training of volunteers so as not to send them on out of country deployments untrained, and it would reduce the required re-training time between deployments due to the model’s ability to always provide trained and ready replacements.

Moreover, the study calculated that a 100,000 man volunteer force would be approximately 0.4 billion Euro cheaper than the proposed conscript force with the current 9 month Wehrpflicht.²¹² In terms of winning recruits for the all-volunteer force, the study recommends an optimal length of service of between 18 to 24 months, with a required length of overseas service of 4 months (less than the current 6 months in the present Bundeswehr). Additional incentives to be offered would be better training in job skills that could be used in the civilian

²¹⁰ Hans-Dieter Lemke, “Welche Bundeswehr für den neuen Auftrag? Die Freiwilligenarmee ist die bessere Lösung,” *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit*, (Berlin: 26 Juni 2003). www.swp-berlin.org

²¹¹ Ibid. p.5.

²¹² Ibid. p.17.

sector, and financial incentives for re-enlistments and for voluntary overseas service.²¹³ The study calculates that these incentives could be funded through the cost savings created by reducing the overall size of the armed forces, and that such savings should allow for an increased investment per soldier of up to 80%.²¹⁴

The second study was conducted by the scientific research branch of the German Bundestag, known as *Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, Fachbereich II*, in October 2003. This study by Alexander Burmeister titled “Does conscription have a future? A contribution to the current Discussion,” is a review of the major arguments for and against the Wehrpflicht in Germany, and includes a look at the experiences of the seven European countries that have recently made the transition to all-volunteer forces. The benefit of this study is that it attempts to address the major issues surrounding the conscription debate in Germany in a pragmatic and non-biased way. It provides evidence, mainly through the experiences of other NATO countries, which finds many of the fears expressed about going to an all-volunteer force unfounded.²¹⁵ For example, the fear that going to a volunteer army would damage the principle of the citizen in uniform and lead to a distancing of the soldiers from society, has not taken place in any of the other European NATO countries transitioning to a volunteer force. Also, the argument that a professional military would eventually lead to the desire to participate in more and more deployments (in effect, lower the threshold for military action) has not been the case in France, which has had a professional force since 1996.²¹⁶

However, in contrast to the SWP study, Burmeister’s research of other European armies’ transition experiences found that the cost savings expected by

²¹³ Ibid. p.21.

²¹⁴ Ibid. p.17.

²¹⁵ Alexander Burmeister, “Hat die Wehrpflicht eine Zukunft? Ein Beitrag zur aktuellen Diskussion,” *Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, Fachbereich II*, (Berlin: 7 October 2003), p.3-4.

²¹⁶ Ibid. p.15.

going to a smaller professional force has not been realized.²¹⁷ From looking at the experiences of these nations, the study reaches the conclusion that the investment portion of a nation's defense budget (the amount available for modernization and other non-personnel costs) is directly affected by whether that nation has a volunteer or conscript army.²¹⁸ But the most striking finding of the Bundestag study involves a country's inability to attract enough volunteers to adequately fill its force structure requirements. Five of the seven countries studied had problems meeting their recruitment needs. The United Kingdom, which has been a professional force for many years, was 4% under its goal for the year studied; Portugal had a 15% shortfall in recruitment needs; the Netherlands a 20% shortfall; and worst of all was Spain, which was 25% below the needed recruitment numbers.²¹⁹ The resulting recommendation from the study was that when a nation decides to make the transition to an all-volunteer force, they should do so gradually over a period of years so as to give time for recruitment efforts to take effect without serious personnel shortfalls.²²⁰

At the action end of all three of these current issues just discussed lays the Bundeswehr and its transformation efforts. As one of the key manifestations of German national security culture, it is only logical to conclude our examination of the most current and pressing issues facing Germany today with a look at the overall progress and direction of Bundeswehr transformation. As discussed in chapter three, funding shortfalls in the defense budget certainly constitute the single greatest challenge to the successful execution of the overall transformation program. But upon closer examination one finds that money is not the only issue.

Conservative criticism of Bundeswehr transformation goes back to the first issue discussed in this section—what is the fundamental aim and goal of German national security policy? The CDU/CSU feels that the technical nature of

²¹⁷ Ibid. p.12.

²¹⁸ Ibid. p.12.

²¹⁹ Ibid. pp.16-21.

²²⁰ Ibid. p.23.

Bundeswehr reform, with its particular weapons procurement programs and concentration on modernization, has actually been the driving factor behind national security strategy—not the other way around as would be expected. This criticism alleges that the government and MoD are writing overall security and defense strategy to suit their already planned technical military transformation program. This then leads to German national security and defense policy being held hostage by the finance ministry's checkbook. According to this view, German security and defense strategy is only as good as its ability to finance the technical transformation programs which are driving it. Unfortunately, most experts realize there is not enough money to go around, and eventual cuts in some procurement and/or transformation actions will have to be made.

However, it is important to point out that Conservatives strongly support the idea of Bundeswehr modernization and transformation. As previously pointed out, they see an expanded role for the Bundeswehr in the new security environment, strongly desire to close the capabilities gap within NATO, and they realize transformation is a key part of achieving these goals. They want to continue Bundeswehr transformation, but they do not want it to become the driving factor behind national security strategy.

The main criticism coming from the Liberal camp of the FDP returns to their opposition to conscription. The Wehrpflicht, according to the FDP, is a severe handicap to Bundeswehr transformation and continuing to hold on to it will result in a two-class army.²²¹ They feel too much attention has been placed upon the deployment forces within the Bundeswehr, leaving non-deploying conscript forces and training units back home with little or no hope of getting the attention and resources they deserve. Instead, all the best equipment and resources are devoted to the first class army, the *Einsatzkräfte*, while the second-class army, the other conscript training and support units, receives what is left over. The FDP is concerned that over time, and with the prospects of more money going to defense highly unlikely, this gap between the force types will only

²²¹ From personal interview with a high level security advisor to the FDP, (Berlin: 7 May 2004).

widen leading to morale and discipline problems. They point to the latest parliamentary commission for military affairs yearly report (*Wehrbeauftragter Jahresbericht*) as proof of their argument. The commission report cites examples of outdated and older equipment in non-deployable and training units while deploying forces received the latest and best equipment.²²²

For the ruling SPD, pressure has been mounting over the last few years to get defense reform right. After putting the Bundeswehr through a steady string of one reform program after the other since 1992, Chancellor Schröder and his Defense Minister Struck need to finally put this issue behind them by pushing through a successful transformation program by 2010. But given Germany's current political and socioeconomic climate, this will not be an easy task. Clearly the SPD is feeling the stress of trying to create a world-class military force on a shoestring budget. Policy-wise, they are facing an up-hill battle with the Wehrpflicht and are now taking hits, as outlined in this chapter, on the overall wisdom of their national security strategy. All of this comes at a time when Finance Minister Eichel is looking at reneging on his promise not to cut any further into the already modest defense budget until 2006. But on a positive note, Defense Minister Struck has won respect from all major parties for his pragmatic views and no-nonsense approach to the challenges facing Bundeswehr transformation.

Partly due to having a share in the responsibilities of government, and partly due to world events, the Green party has developed a surprisingly pragmatic view toward Bundeswehr transformation. They do not wish to see the military under-funded and are entirely supportive of the general transformation plan and its three types of forces. Having been a part of the ruling coalition for seven years now, they also have developed an appreciation for how the military has a role in defining and protecting Germany's national interests. But they part company from their coalition brethren when it comes to the Wehrpflicht and still

²²² "German Armed Forces Shortfalls Shown in Report," Deutsche Press Agentur, 9 March 2004.

see no need to try and create military forces comparable to France, Britain, and the United States.

From the summary of the various arguments and positions outlined above, it is easy to get the impression there are virtually no areas of agreement among the major parties in the area of security policy and defense reform. But that is not the case. There is total consensus and support for the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and for the specific military oriented European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). All major parties recognize that Europeans must work together in the security and defense arena, and therefore, there is unanimous support for the idea of role specialization within European armed forces. In a sense, it can be viewed as tremendous progress that the different political parties and factions are debating the various nuances and details of security and defense policy. After all, it was not so many years ago that Germans were debating on whether to have a military force at all.

B. THE SOLDIER LEVEL

It is appropriate and necessary to closely examine the ideas of national security culture, security and defense policy, and armed forces transformation from the political elite and governmental or ministerial level. It is at this level that decisions are made, policies written, and political compromises met. But equally important and worthy of inclusion are the attitudes, opinions, and experiences of those at the action end of the policies and decisions made at the higher levels. This means, of course, looking at the individual soldier and small unit level. It is at this level that the high words of government officials and the headlines of transformation give way to the straight talk of sergeants and the uneasy feelings of new recruits.

One of the best sources for insights into the issues and concerns of the men and women of the Bundeswehr is the annual report by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Military Affairs, or *Wehrbeauftragte des Deutschen Bundestages*. The goal of the Commissioner is to provide oversight on behalf of the German Parliament of the treatment, condition, and welfare of the men and

women of the German armed forces. Each year the Commissioner compiles a list of all official soldier complaints registered at his office and publishes an overall assessment of his findings in the form of the yearly report. Admittedly, such a report of only negative complaints contains largely anecdotal information and its content must be analyzed carefully, and viewed in comparison with previous year's reports. Never the less, the Commissioner's report receives public attention in Germany and is a good source for insight into the specific problems and complaints of the soldiers themselves.

The 2003 annual report, prepared by the Parliamentary Commissioner, Dr. Willfried Penner, was released on 9 March 2004 and contains some noteworthy observations. Overall, the 6,082 total complaints were down by 354 over last year, with the majority of the complaints, 1,980, centering on the issue of promotion and personal advancement. But the most interesting finding, and the most germane to this thesis, was the amount of object difficulties resulting from the "unrelenting pressure of the chain of Bundeswehr reforms during the past decade."²²³ In fact it was some of these "difficulties" related to the pressure of Bundeswehr reform that grabbed the headlines upon the report's public release. According to an article from the German Press Agency,

The annual report shows top line equipment and experienced soldiers are earmarked for German military missions in Afghanistan and the Balkans, while troops at home have to make do with whatever is left over.²²⁴

One negative side effect of pursuing defense reform in a time of increased international deployments and funding shortfalls, is that, as Commissioner Penner himself said, "Improvising is the name of the game." The press article highlighted an example from a German armored battalion that was supposed to have 44 operational tanks. 10 tanks were unavailable because they had been mothballed, a further 14 tanks were missing after being commandeered by a

²²³ "Wehrbeauftragter legt Jahresbericht vor," article taken from the German Ministry of Defense website, (Berlin: 11 March 2004). Author's translation. www.bmvg.de

²²⁴ "German Armed Forces Shortfalls Shown in Report," German Press Agency, 9 March 2004.

rapid reaction force, and many of the remaining 20 tanks were in varying states of disrepair.²²⁵

Another useful mechanism for gaining insight into the Bundeswehr comes from a set of public opinion polls commissioned in 2003 by the Ministry of Defense and conducted by two separate private polling services.²²⁶ Although these polls do not specifically represent the attitudes and feelings of just Bundeswehr soldiers, both were conducted nationwide and one only polled those in the 16 to 20 year old group—an age group that could potentially be very much effected by conscription and Bundeswehr issues.

When asked to respond to the statement, “Mandatory military service is an important citizen obligation,” 60% of the respondents either fully or partially agreed.²²⁷ This speaks to the well-established German national security culture that holds the principle of “citizen in uniform” in high regard, and proves that despite allegations of pacifism among German society, the overwhelming majority of Germans see military service as one of the most important civic duties. When this same audience was then asked if Germany should retain conscription or transition to a volunteer force, the results were almost equally split 50-50. However, when the question of the Wehrpflicht was posed to just the 16-20 year old group, a full 63% of those polled decided for the all-volunteer army.²²⁸ This clearly indicates that while the general population is undecided on the important issue of the Wehrpflicht, those most likely to be called-up for military service favor the volunteer system.

Interestingly, when the 16-20 year old audience was asked to give their personal overall impression of the Bundeswehr, 62% of the respondents had either a positive or rather positive view of the Bundeswehr. This is virtually the

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ These two 2003 opinion polls are: “Die EMNID Poll—The Bundeswehr plays an important role for the Population,” and “Die sinus Poll—Young people trust the institution of the Bundeswehr,” both polls can be accessed via the German Ministry of Defense website at www.bmvg.de/sicherheit/040301_umfrage

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

same percentage of young people who felt Germany should transition to an all-volunteer force. This positive image of the Bundeswehr was confirmed by the results from another poll question, which asked respondents to list the public service professions in which they had the most trust. The Bundeswehr was ranked as the third most trusted public service profession, with the police and the Supreme Court ranking number one and two respectively. But these encouraging results were balanced by the rather low numbers of Germans who said they had any interest at all in security and defense issues, and the extremely low percentage of the population that was specifically interested in the Bundeswehr. Only about 14% of those polled said they were “very interested” in security and defense policy and about 41% said they had “little interest.” When asked specifically about the Bundeswehr, only 9% said they were “very interested,” and 50% said they had “little interest” in the armed forces. However, it should be noted that these 2003 results are actually a slight improvement over the 2002 opinion poll results which asked the same questions. Notwithstanding the effects of German political and strategic culture on these numbers, perhaps the biggest reason for such relative indifference of the population to security and defense issues is the overwhelming preoccupation of most people on unemployment. With current unemployment levels in Germany reaching between 10 and 12 percent, it is understandable that when asked what the most important political task facing the government was, 84% said creating jobs and lowering the unemployment rate. Likewise, only 11% cited working for a Common European Security Policy as an important task.²²⁹

While one must always be wary of placing too much value in opinion poll results, these 2003 results do shed considerable light upon how German society perceives security and defense policy in general and how they feel about the Bundeswehr specifically. The opinions reflected in these polls seem to confirm the conclusions of this essay regarding the nature and influence of strategic culture upon the way in which Germans interpret the world around them, and its effects upon military and defense reform specifically. One can conclude that

²²⁹ Ibid.

while recent external forces (like ethnic violence and international terrorism) have made Germans more aware of security and defense issues, key internal forces (mainly the culture of *Zurückhaltung* and unemployment) have kept the majority's attention turned toward economic and social issues.

C. SUMMARY

By examining these rather different current perspectives from both the political and soldier level it becomes evident that culture does matter, but present realities also matter. If we are to find an appropriate ending point to the discussions of this thesis it must be in the acknowledgement that German national security culture has evolved and matured since 1989; and the Bundeswehr has come along for the ride, often times even seizing the steering wheel and becoming the driving force behind reform. Germany has struggled to find its way along the confusing and rapidly changing path of security and defense issues in the 21st century. Along the way it has confronted many of the demons of the past that have plagued German society and defense intellectuals for decades, and slowly in a step-wise fashion Germany has fielded a modern military force commensurate with its political will and weight.

As to whether Germany has now “normalized” in the field of foreign and security policy this author is not qualified to judge, but through the tremendous stresses and strains of the post-Cold War environment Germany has emerged as a different nation with a different Bundeswehr than before. There are, to be sure, security and defense related challenges ahead and several key questions still have to be answered. But there have also been lessons learned and problems solved. And it is on this point that the conclusion of this study would like to concentrate. It should be noted that the title of this thesis is “...a struggle to be understood.” What should be understood is that since the end of the Cold War, German leaders have engaged in the classic internal-external debate required in the formulation of foreign and security policy, and have done so as only Germany can. The various political, popular, and governmental interests have worked to find the needed consensus which Hanrieder described. This process was and is

often complicated, sometimes clumsy, and always involved a junior coalition partner. This is a point that seems to often be misunderstood or even overlooked by many of Germany's western friends and allies. This includes the United States of America. As Donald Abenheim observed, "Since the early 1960s, too few American observers of policy have given enough attention to the workings of diplomacy and strategy amongst the Atlantic democracies."²³⁰

Unfortunately in the most recent case of the German position on the US-led Iraq war, this has led to what most writers are calling the 'trans-Atlantic rift,' and a most uncomfortable German-American relationship. If this rift is to be overcome, and a return to a better more trustworthy relationship accomplished, then it must come through a better understanding and appreciation of what has been discussed in this thesis. That is an appreciation of national security culture and the effects of such culture upon policy decisions. The tendency to interpret foreign and security policy in strictly realists terms, and simply in terms of being for or against a particular action only goes so far, and is precisely the type of tunnel vision that contributes to misunderstandings and wrong impressions. It is this author's belief that only through an understanding of and an appreciation for where Germany has been, the culture that has influenced it, and the progress that has already been made, can the story of German foreign and defense policy since the end of the Cold War be properly understood. With these things in mind, not only can the current trans-Atlantic rift be overcome, but Germany itself will find it easier to answer the questions that lie ahead and to build the consensus needed to settle the debates of the future.

²³⁰ Donald Abenheim, Foreword to *Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, December 1996, p. ix.

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